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 In my dissertation, I investigate the choice between internal and external venture 
formation. Actors often leave in pursuit of new ventures, even though entrepreneurial 
opportunities may exist inside the firm. While a bulk of work has focused on 
understanding the determinants of entrepreneurial transition (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 
2006; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Robinson and Sexton, 1994; Sørensen, 2007a; 2007b), 
whether nascent entrepreneurs leave to form new ventures or stay put inside the 
organization remains less clear. Addressing this research lacuna, my dissertation 
examines the conflicting choices faced by nascent entrepreneurs and their consequences 
for established organizations. Whereas economic perspectives have focused almost 
exclusively on the role of incentive structures in determining entrepreneurial choices 
(Anton and Yao, 1995; Hellman, 2006), my dissertation emphasizes the impact of the 
social context in determining the direction in which would-be entrepreneurs deploy their 
efforts. Drawing on the rich sociological tradition of embedding an individual’s decision 
making in the social context (e.g., Granovetter, 1985), I uncover the social determinants 
of entrepreneurial choices and their consequences for existing organizations. In the first 
two studies, I offer a socio-structural perspective on the choices pursued by nascent 






formative experiences (first study), and his or her position in the informal network 
(second study). In the first study, I suggest that formative experiences may affect the 
direction of the entrepreneurial choices, by providing exposure to risk-taking, autonomy, 
and entrepreneurial coworkers. Findings corroborate the hypothesized relations; nascent 
entrepreneurs transition to external more than to internal ventures when, early in the 
career, they gain exposure to risk and are socialized with coworkers who founded 
external ventures. The imprinting effect is partially mitigated by adaptive learning:  
negative feedback that individuals receive when performing their actions decreases the 
influence of imprinting on entrepreneurship choices. In the second study, I draw on the 
network literature to suggest that informal social ties serve as external referents 
pertaining to the conflicting choices of entrepreneurship. Findings indicate that formal 
organizational structures influence the choice of entrepreneurship: nascent entrepreneurs 
provided with greater discretion and compensation are more likely to found internal 
rather than external ventures. Moreover, I find that nascent entrepreneurs are more likely 
to found external (internal) ventures if their school network members created external 
(internal) ventures in the past. The effect of school networks is amplified with geographic 
proximity and gender homophily. The third study focuses on the consequences of the 
entrepreneurship choices; notably, I explore the impact of these choices on established 
organizations. Using a conceptual framework of power dependence (Emerson, 1962), I 
predict that organizations will strengthen their internal incentive structures to retain 






that established organizations adapt to entrepreneurship choices: organizations provide 
greater compensation and discretion to employees at higher risk of departures. 
Organizational adaptation to the threat of entrepreneurial departures decreases with 
organizational performance and scope. Together, my dissertation has important 
theoretical implications: it enhances the understanding of an individual’s role in 
redrawing organizational boundaries. I test my hypotheses using longitudinal data on the 







Overview                             
In today’s fast-paced environment, organizations face an increasing challenge to 
foster growth through product innovation and internal venture formation (Baum and 
Oliver, 1996; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Although, every year, organizations invest billions of dollars to train their employees to 
create new divisions and products, organizational members with good ideas often leave to 
found their own ventures. For example, several employees of Fairchild left to found Intel 
and a number of Google’s managers have recently defected to start new organizations. A 
theme underlying the above examples is that, in an increasingly knowledge-based post-
industrial economy, where talent and skills are readily portable, individuals are faced 
with the following decision: should they deploy their creative efforts internally, or should 
they leave to found new organizations. Because this decision is vital for the entrepreneur 
and the parent company itself, it is important to understand its determinants and 
consequences. Hence, the objective of the dissertation is to theoretically outline and 
empirically assess (1) the determinants of entrepreneurship choices, and (2) their impact 
on established organizations. 
The question regarding the conflicting alternatives available to nascent 






new organizations (e.g., Aldrich and Widenmeyer, 1993). A large body of work has 
documented that entrepreneurs emerge from existing organizations (Aldrich and 
Widenmeyer, 1993; see Audia and Rider, 2006 for review), which provide bountiful 
resources that enhance an individual’s motivation and ability to create new ventures (e.g., 
Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman, 2002; Freeman, 1986; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; 
Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005; Robinson and Sexton, 1994; Romanelli, 1989; 
Romanelli and Schoonhoven, 2001). For example, past employment has been shown to 
equip organizational members with confidence (Higgins, 2005; Sorenson and Audia, 
2000), information about entrepreneurial opportunities (Romanelli, 1989), and social 
capital (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Higgins, 2005), all of which facilitate transition to 
entrepreneurship. While they provide a useful insight, studies in this area have largely 
focused on actors who have already self-selected to found new organizations and rarely 
examined the preceding decision pertaining to internal versus external venture formation. 
Instead, the standard accounts in strategic management and economics have related 
entrepreneurial departures to a lack of opportunities for an internal venture formation. 
From this perspective, organizational members leave to pursue innovative ideas outside, 
when parent firms miss opportunities beyond their core businesses (Henderson and Clark, 
1990, Tushman and Anderson, 1986), or lack interest to support an employee-generated 
innovation (Klepper, 2001; Wiggins, 1995). Although informative, these approaches 
focus largely on the organization and attribute less weight to the social actor. Yet, as 






organizational members in affecting the locus of new ventures becomes increasingly 
important. Consequently, there is a growing need to model the decision regarding internal 
versus external venture formation on an individual level.  
My dissertation addresses the limitations of prior research in several ways. The 
first two empirical studies examine the factors that influence the choice between 
conflicting entrepreneurial trajectories. While much insight can be gained from economic 
approaches emphasizing the role of financial incentives (e.g., Anton and Yao, 1995), my 
dissertation offers a uniquely socio-structural perspective. In the first study, I relate 
entrepreneurship choices to career histories and argue that formative career conditions, 
which I term career imprints, influence whether potential entrepreneurs deploy their 
efforts internally or externally. The second study expands the initial model by further 
exploring the role of a social structure in affecting the entrepreneurship choices. I embed 
my arguments in several literatures, including studies on career histories (e.g., Higgins, 
2005; Shane and Khurana, 2003), theories of social imprinting (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965), 
and research on interpersonal networks (e.g., Granovetter, 1973). In the third empirical 
study, I shift the focus away from individuals to examine the impact of entrepreneurship 
choices on established organizations. To that end, I address the following question: How 
do firms change their structures in response to the risk of entrepreneurial defections? I 
expect that firms will strengthen their internal incentive structures in an effort to retain 
valuable entrepreneurial talent, when faced with a risk of entrepreneurial exits. I embed 






perspectives that study individual career choices and organizational life chances (e.g., 
Phillips, 2002), and the studies on talent management (e.g., Cappelli, 2004; 2006; 2008).  
 In response to the limitations of previous work, my dissertation examines factors 
responsible for an individual’s decision to found a new venture either internally or 
externally. The three papers have theoretical implications that extend well beyond 
entrepreneurial process; they pertain to the vital question regarding organizational 
boundaries. Organization theorists and economists alike have long been concerned with 
the way organizations are bounded and delimited from their external environment (e.g., 
Coase, 1937; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Thompson, 1965; Williamson, 1985). Although 
boundaries of the firm have been conceptualized differently across various theoretical 
paradigms (see Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005 for review), each proposing a distinct set of 
rules to specify the sphere of an organizational activity or influence, a common 
assumption underlying these theories suggests that organizational boundaries are placed, 
regulated, and maintained by the unitary decision-maker that amounts to more than just 
the sum of its parts – the organization itself.
1
 However, less attention has been devoted to 
understanding how members of the organization at the operational level, redraw the 
boundaries of the organization by choosing to deploy their efforts towards the creation of 
new ventures either internally or externally. By determining the locus of a new venture, 
nascent entrepreneurs influence which activities will be conducted inside the 
                                                        
1 Examples of inclusion criteria that specify organizational boundary include power and influence (e.g., 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), resources (e.g., Penrose, 1959, Chandler, 1977), identity (e.g., Kogut and 






organization, and which activities will fall outside an organizational boundary. Moreover, 
research on organizational boundaries has been largely dominated by the atomistic 
exchange efficiency approaches that focus on incentives and pecuniary self-interests held 
by organizational actors (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005). As a result, our understanding of 
organizational boundaries has been largely divorced from contextual influences on the 
actors’ behaviors. For example, less is known about the impact of a social structure on 
the choice of a new venture.   
 In the next section, I discuss in greater detail the theoretical motivation underlying 
the research questions addressed in the dissertation. Thereafter, I provide a short 
overview of the study’s empirical design. Finally, I summarize the key contributions of 
the dissertation to the sociological perspectives on entrepreneurship and organization 
theory. 
Research Problem and Theoretical Motivation 
 Diverse streams of research have attached different definitions to entrepreneurial 
activity. While entrepreneurship has been typically seen as the creation of de novo start-
ups (e.g., Aldrich, 1999; Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Thornton, 1999), entrepreneurial 
activity does not require the creation of new organizations (Amit, Glosten, Mueller, 1993; 
Casson, 1982; Shane and Vekataraman, 2000). The Schumpeterian perspective associates 
entrepreneurship with an innovative combination that can lead to a set of outcomes, 
including the formation of a new method of production, a new market, a new source of 






entrepreneurial processes may take place inside or outside the organization. In both cases, 
organizational members represent an engine behind the exploitation of innovative ideas. 
While some actors choose to leave in pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities outside, 
others develop their innovations inside, turning into intrapreneurs (Pinchot, 1985).
2
 
Hence, the fundamental dilemma faced by organizational members is whether to pursue 
new ideas inside the firm, or leave the employer to establish a new venture outside. 
 The tension between an internal and external venture formation is considerable, 
given the important trade-offs implicated in the choice. From the employee’s perspective, 
internal venturing has the advantage of lower risk, as compared to the pursuit of new 
ventures outside. First, internal venture formation relies on resources that remain, to some 
extent, nested in the larger resource combination constituted by the firm (e.g., 
Burgelman, 1983; Pinchot, 1985). Instead of having to independently mobilize an array 
of resources, intrapreneurs can utilize a pool of organizational resources destined towards 
the development of employee-generated innovations. Moreover, intrapreneurs face lower 
labor market risks because the parent company can always reallocate a failed intrapreneur 
to another task (Scharfstein and Gromb, 2002). By contrast, the choice of an external 
entrepreneurship requires that nascent entrepreneurs mobilize social and material 
resources dispersed in the environment with their own unique resources (Stinchcombe, 
                                                        
2 Although studies on corporate entrepreneurship typically consider a new venture formation as a firm-level 
phenomenon, they have nevertheless emphasized the role of individual initiatives (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 
1984). For example, Burgelman (1983) suggests that ―the motor of corporate entrepreneurship resides in 
the autonomous and strategic initiative of individuals at the operational level of the organization.‖ (1983: 
241). Aghion and Tirole (1997) further suggest that because the ―real authority‖ lies with the management, 






1965). In this process, rewards and payoffs are highly uncertain (Knight, 1921), and 
many potential entrepreneurs fail to even secure the necessary resources (Sørensen and 
Sorenson, 2003).  
 Despite the challenges of exploiting a new venture through a start-up, 
organizational members often choose to pursue their ideas externally based on, at least, 
two grounds. First, entrepreneurship is perceived as a lucrative alternative (Kirzner 
1973), whereby talented individuals are able to derive profits on their human capital 
(Groysberg, Nanda, and Prats, 2007), instead of sharing them with the parent firm. 
Second, entrepreneurs may trade higher security of internal venturing for greater 
autonomy, when exploiting innovative ideas through start-ups. Because entrepreneurs 
represent de facto owners, they are equipped with greater discretionary powers over a 
new venture.  
 In my dissertation, I address some of the shortcomings evident in the previous 
literature. I propose three empirical studies to explore the determinants and consequences 
of the entrepreneurship choices. Because the question of entrepreneurial choices allows 
for probing the role of a social actor in shaping the boundaries of the organization, the 
dissertation contributes to a richer understanding of how organizational boundaries are 
socially constructed in a knowledge-intensive economy.  
Empirical Design 
 To test my theoretical framework, I use an empirical context of the mutual fund 






determinants of entrepreneurship choices for several reasons. First, modeling the 
dependence of internal and external entrepreneurship choices is non-trivial; it requires 
finding a context in which both internal and external venture formation can be observed 
and studied in conjunction.
3
 Unlike many other settings, the mutual fund context offers a 
unique opportunity to empirically isolate both internally and externally created ventures. 
In this knowledge-intensive environment absent non-compete clauses, highly skilled and 
mobile managers are able to easily found a new venture either inside (i.e., a new fund) or 
outside an established organization (i.e., a new company). Moreover, over the past three 
decades, the mutual fund industry experienced an unprecedented growth in the formation 
of internal and external ventures alike – overall, the number of funds grew from 564 to 
over 8,000 between 1980 and 2000s. Finally, the mutual fund context offers an advantage 
of studying and comparing the entire population of intra- and entrepreneurs.  
Contributions           
 In my dissertation, I address the limitations of prior research by trying to 
understand an individual’s decision to create a new venture internally versus externally. 
Specifically, I offer a socio-structural perspective to examine (1) the determinants of 
entrepreneurship choices, and (2) the consequences of such choices for the firm. More 
                                                        
3 Existing research has theorized about the conditions under which employees choose to commercialize 
their ideas in external spinoffs rather than within the firm (Anton and Yao, 1995, Klepper and Sleeper, 
2002, Klepper, 2001, Klepper and Thompson, 2006). The present study is different from that research in at 
least two respects. First, while previous studies have typically related the outside decision to the 
entrepreneur’s inability to choose inside, I examine entrepreneurial choices when possibilities for both 
inside and outside ventures exist. Second, the present study compares empirically internal and external 
venture formation, whereas existing studies have been largely theoretical (e.g., Anton and Yao, 1995), or 






broadly, the goal of the dissertation is to contribute to organizational theory by enhancing 
the understanding of an individual’s role in shaping the boundaries around organizations. 
While prior literature has primarily taken an exchange efficiency approach to understand 
organizational boundaries (e.g., Williamson, 1985), I hope to provide a more ―socialized‖ 
account by taking into consideration career trajectories and social structure to predict the 
direction (i.e., inside or outside) in which nascent entrepreneurs will deploy their efforts. 
Finally, by examining the determinants of entrepreneurial choices, I contribute to the 
literature that tries to understand theoretical mechanisms behind spin-offs (e.g., Brittain 
and Freeman, 1986; Romanelli, 1989), and the research on the emergence of new 
organizations (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006), more broadly.  
 Understanding the locus of new ventures is also essential on practical grounds. 
Entrepreneurial defections represent an important opportunity cost associated with losing 
potential internal ventures that could otherwise generate value for the firm via growth and 
profitability (Covin and Slevin, 1986; 1991; Hisrich and Peters, 1998; Zahra, 1991). 
Entrepreneurial exits increase the risk of knowledge appropriation by organizational 
members (Rajan and Zingales, 2001), as important organizational knowledge and 
routines are transferred from the parent firm to a progeny via the migrating personnel 
(Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, and Sarkar, 2004; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973; Phillips, 
2002). Because human capital is highly mobile and can quit at will, knowledge can easily 
be transferred (Boeker, 1997) and expropriated by organizational members (Arrow, 






organizational members choose to leave in pursuit of new ventures, as opposed to staying 
put, lies at the heart of creating value and maintaining competitive advantage.  
 Finally, examining the conditions that privilege one type of entrepreneurial activity 
over another provides additional insights into the dynamics behind economic growth. In 
today’s corporate America, 71 percent of young and new firms have been founded by 
entrepreneurial actors who encountered the idea during their past employment (Bhide, 
2000). As the emergence of new independent ventures shapes the landscape of industries 
and the economy as a whole, exploring the sources of those ventures is essential to 
comprehend the dynamics of the knowledge-based economy. Following the 
Schumpeterian tradition, entrepreneurship leads to economic progress and wealth 
creation (e.g., Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Schumpeter, 1934; Scherer, 1984). Therefore, 
enhancing the understanding of wealth creation in the society represents an additional 






CHAPTER II:  MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY GROWTH, 1979-2006
Introduction 
 This chapter provides some background on the mutual fund industry growth in the 
period between 1979 and 2006. The chapter is organized as follows. I first discuss the 
advantages of the mutual fund industry as an empirical context for the research questions 
addressed. I further offer an organizational perspective on mutual funds by providing a 
background on their organizational structures and functions. Finally, I define 
entrepreneurship in the mutual fund industry: I discuss actors and processes relevant to 
the entrepreneurship choices. Overall, the objective of the present chapter is to provide an 
overview of the industry and to better situate the three papers in the empirical context. 
The Mutual Fund Industry: Choice of Empirical Setting  
 I use the context of the mutual fund industry to understand when organizational 
members create internal ventures, as opposed to leaving to found new ventures outside. 
This context provides an ideal setting for several reasons. First, over the past three 
decades, the mutual fund industry experienced an unprecedented growth both in internal 
and external ventures, as numerous products, product categories, and free-standing 
ventures have been developed and marketed by individual and organizational actors 






and 2007, and the funds’ population increased exponentially by 168% in the 1990s alone 
due to a higher demand for retirement savings and personal pension plans, such as 401k 
(Investment Company Institute).
4
 Currently, there are more mutual funds in the United 
States than companies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges, and mutual funds have become 
the most significant corporate owners in the United States, holding 25% of the 
outstanding stock of all publicly traded U.S. companies and a total of $13 trillion in 
assets. Forty-five percent of all U.S. households owned mutual funds in 2008, compared 
with less than 6 percent in 1980. 
  
Figure 1:  Mutual funds’ expansion, 1940-2007. (Data compiled by the Investment Company 
Institute) 
                                    
 The second advantage of the mutual fund context pertains to the fact that the 
industry represents a knowledge-based environment, where highly skilled and talented 
portfolio managers are responsible for buying and selling securities, based upon 
                                                        
4 The households owning mutual funds rose from 4.6 million to 52.5 million, and the number of 
shareholder accounts rose from just 12 million to about 265 million between 1980 and 2008. For more 






investment judgment and extensive financial research (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). 
Whereas existing theoretical paradigms have been typically rooted in the Schumpeterian 
tradition of efficiency, economies of scales and manufacturing (Schumpeter, 1934), we 
know less about entrepreneurial processes in the post-industrial era, marked by 
legitimacy enhancement (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and knowledge production (e.g., 
Bell 1973; Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992). As a human capital-intensive environment, 
referred to as ―a people-driven business‖ (Darragh, Dodig, and O’Hanley, 1997), asset 
management is uniquely suited to theorizing about the mechanisms of post-industrial 
entrepreneurship.  
Compared to other knowledge-based industries, the mutual fund context offers 
another important advantage; because the industry is absent non-compete clauses, mobile 
fund managers are able to create new ventures (funds) not only inside but also, foremost, 
outside their parent companies. Consequently, entrepreneurial fund managers face two 
choices: they may create new funds inside, or they leave to start up a new fund externally. 
 Finally, studying mutual funds enhances the understanding of entrepreneurship in 
financial markets. Financial services have rapidly become a terrain fruitful for innovation 
and entrepreneurship, as numerous products, product categories, and free-standing 
ventures have been developed and marketed by individual and organizational actors 
(Davis, 2008; 2009). Moreover, the past two decades witnessed the emergence and 
proliferation of new financial industries, such as hedge funds, on-line brokerages, and 






products, entrepreneurial mechanisms and agents behind them have received only a 
scarce scholarly attention. However, as financial services have grown to become larger in 
scale than ever before, spanning a wide range of products and services, the need to 
understand financial institutions and their expansive influence over the society has 
become evident (Davis, 2008; 2009). Therefore, by examining the creation of new 
ventures in the mutual fund context, this study tries to enhance the understanding of the 
mechanisms behind the recent expansion of financial markets.  
Organizational Perspective on Mutual Funds 
 To uncover the entrepreneurial processes in financial services, it is first necessary 
to understand the structure and the functions of mutual funds. In many ways, funds are 
comparable to a typical organization in the United States; the ―relevant‖ organizational 
unit is an investment company, also referred to as an ―advisor,‖ or a ―management 
company.‖ The majority of investment companies represent independent publicly traded 
or privately owned firms. The rest are either wholly owned subsidiary of financial 
services, such as banks and insurance companies, or independent securities broker-
dealers, known as ―fund distributors.‖ Despite the rapid growth of the industry over the 
last two decades, most assets remain allocated in the hands of a few large independent 
investment companies - Fidelity, Vanguard, American Funds, T. Rowe Price, and Janus.
5
 
The single largest shareholder is the Fidelity family that offers more than 300 mutual 
                                                        
5 The Investment Company Institute indicates that the holdings of the top fund families have not changed 
between 1985 and 2007, where the top 5 investment companies held, on average 35%, and the top 25 







Like in the case of Fidelity, new ventures are typically created by independent 
investment companies, whereby a single organization can launch multiple funds, each 
representing a strategic business unit with a separate legal entity, its own directors, and its 
own portfolio managers. Funds differ across the spectrum of investment styles, size, fees 
and expenses, region and industry specialization, as well as services provided to their 
owners. Broadly, each fund can be classified with respect to its investment objective as 
either equity or fixed-income (i.e. bonds). All funds are actively or passively managed. 
Active management involves buying and selling securities based upon economic, 
financial, and market analyses and investment judgment, whereas passive management 
requires that designated market indexes are matched in an attempt to achieve the same 
investment return as those indexes. The main objective behind the ―indexing approach‖ is 
to reduce the risk that the fund will perform differently from the index. While some 
investment companies specialize predominantly in one type of funds (e.g., the Vanguard), 
most firms offer a broader array of fund types to their investors. Newly created funds 
may have a novel investment objective; for instance, a new fund may represent the first 
socially responsible fund in its parent family. Alternatively, a new fund may serve as an 
addition to an already existing category of funds; for example, a European fund may be 
the first in the category of equity funds. In cases, a new business division or a product 
line is created inside an established investment company.     






channels, research managers, and traditions represents a ―fund family.‖ While funds 
belonging to the same family are typically managed in-house by the founding investment 
company, the company may choose to outsource funds’ management to a ―sub-advisor‖ 
or an external management company. Figure 2 illustrates a structure of internally 
managed funds, whereby the investment company manages all its products in-house. 
Figure 3 presents the structure of outsourced funds, whereby the management of at least 
one of the two funds is contracted out to an external advisor. A seminal example of the 
fund family that contracts out to investment management companies is Vanguard, which 
outsources its active equity management to sub-advisors, such as the Wellington Capital. 
External fund management is more prevalent across smaller fund families that lack 
expertise required to manage newly launched funds. For this reason, the majority of funds 
continue to use in-house money management and to develop internal labor markets 
(Kuhnen, 2007).  
     
Figure 2: Internally managed funds         Figure 3: Sub-advised funds 
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Internal and External Entrepreneurship Choices in Mutual Funds 
 In the mutual fund industry, boundary choices can include several decisions. One 
way to demarcate an organizational boundary is to decide whether to manage funds 
internally, or contract them out to investment management, or else implement a mixture 
of the two. Boundaries can further be shaped by the decision regarding distribution 
channels – whether developed and owned by the company, or outsourced to a distributor 
outside. In my dissertation, I focus on yet another decision that pertains to a firm’s 
boundary: the choice of a new product line. Specifically, I examine when the 
organization expands its product line by founding a new fund internally and when, by 
contrast, a new fund is founded outside via the departure of an entrepreneurial employee.   
Highly skilled portfolio managers represent the engine behind the creation of both 
internal and external funds for several reasons. First, managers are uniquely positioned to 
access diverse internal and external information sources, which may stimulate the 
development of ideas for new fund strategies. For example, one of the most successful 
portfolio managers, the Fidelity’s Peter Lynch, would ―talk to dozens of company 
managers, brokers and analysts every day.‖ 
6
 Creative portfolio managers typically face 
two conflicting alternatives; they may either launch their fund inside, or leave to exploit 
ideas for new ventures outside. From the perspective of entrepreneurial managers, these 
choices involve evident trade-offs.        
 There have been ample opportunities for portfolio managers to launch internal 







funds over the last two decades. Since their emergence, independent professional 
management companies have been the pioneers of entrepreneurship and innovation, 
allowing portfolio managers to develop new product lines across different kinds of 
securities (Lounsbury and Leblebici, 2004). As a result, the average number of funds 
under the supervision of a single manager increased from 1 in 1979 to 2.5 in 2006 
(author’s analyses). This suggests that a typical portfolio manager would oversee more 
than two funds in 2006, some of which could be attributed to the manager’s 
entrepreneurial ideas. Informal interviews, conducted as a part of the study, provide 
evidence that fund managers play an important role in internal fund creation. One 
manager explained: 
―I came up with an idea to open a technology fund, when I realized that smaller 
high tech companies are an attractive buy for us. My fund turned out a big success, 
given the market conditions.‖ 
 
 Because, in mutual funds, manager’s profits are directly based on his on her 
performance, successful managers are able to derive substantial revenues even when 
developing a new venture inside. Maybe the most known example, the mastermind 
behind the Fidelity’s Magellan - Peter Lynch - made millions of dollars, as his fund has 
grown from $18 million to $14 billion in assets between 1977 and 1990. Moreover, 
intrapreneurial portfolio managers face lower risk, when exploiting innovative ideas 
inside. Although portfolio managers experience high turnover rates, as they often are 
fired for below-the-market performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999), a decision to 






in this process, risk is shared between the employer and the employee.  
 While portfolio managers derive substantial profits from internally launched 
ventures, they nevertheless contemplate an alternative trajectory of leaving to pursue 
ideas outside. Managers can walk out the door if they are unhappy,‖ as they enjoy ―great 
freedom of movement‖ (Darragh, Dodig, and O’Hanley, 1997). From the manager’s 
perspective, external entrepreneurship offers several advantages. First, entrepreneurs may 
derive higher profits from their human capital, consistent with the findings showing the 
probability of entrepreneurial transition to increase for star analysts (Groysberg, Nanda, 
and Prats, 2007). For instance, in May 1996, Jeffrey Vinik, the head of Magellan – the 
Fidelity’s flagship and then the largest actively managed mutual fund in the United States 
– left to open a hedge fund. His hedge fund, Vinik Partners, has earned a total return of 
646% before fees since he launched it versus 110% for the S&P 500. As a result, Vinik 
and his two partners have pocketed around $800 million as their share of the fund's 
profits.   
 Another important factor that may underline the decision to leave the current 
employer is the quest for autonomy and discretion. Because portfolio managers are 
motivated by autonomy (Arvedlund, 2002), they search for environments allowing for 
greater discretion. Consistently, anecdotal evidence suggests that greater decision-making 
power and lower administrative constraints may have motivated portfolio managers to 
massively leave for less regulated hedge funds. George Hall, a hedge fund manager, 






―[Hedge funds] isolate what the manager actually does. His ability becomes 
picking stocks, not having to bother with the administrative trouble of putting 
85% of his fund’s stock into an index because he knows that if he doesn’t attack 




That portfolio managers value autonomy and discretion has further been reflected 
in the efforts of the investment companies to foster entrepreneurial culture in order to 
attract and retain prospective entrepreneurs. For example, Freedom Capital Management 
states,  
―Our firm encourages entrepreneurial thinking and debate. Each manager and 




Similarly, another manager notes:  
―Our process allows us to test and challenge our assumptions amongst our 
colleagues from our value equity, growth equity and fixed income teams, 





Finally, Darragh and colleagues (1997) contend,  
―Virtually all entrepreneurial industries – from autos in the 1920s to software in 
the 1990s – have eventually reached a point where technical and functional 
excellence was no longer sufficient for success. Investment management is no 
different. The art is to design an organization that ensures professional 
management without impeding the flexibility and autonomy of existing talent to 
do what they are best at.‖ 
While externally launched funds may yield higher profits and help secure greater 
autonomy, they are inevitably associated with considerable financial and reputational 
                                                        
7 Source: Forbes, 2001. 
8 Source: Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers  






risks. In a competitive asset management industry, entrepreneurial failure rates are high 
and individual actors often incur substantial losses. As described in the popular press:  
―When Gilbert's fund flamed out, he became paralyzed with depression, closed the 
curtains and refused to leave his bed. Wife Sharon was left to tell his team of 12 
that they no longer had jobs, and to liquidate the firm.‖  (Biggs, 2006: 56). 
Conclusion  
Overall, the mutual fund industry provides an excellent setting to uncover the 
mechanisms behind the manager’s decision to exploit an innovative idea either inside or 
leave and pursue market opportunities outside. Highly skilled mutual fund managers play 
a central role in developing new funds internally and externally. As a result, creative 
managers are faced with an important choice that involves evident trade-offs: they may 
either deploy their efforts internally, or leave to found new ventures outside. By 
examining how portfolio managers decide between the conflicting trajectories, I hope to 
contribute to the development of the theoretical mechanisms that could be generalized to 
contexts outside the asset management. Given the knowledge-intensive nature of the 
industry, I expect my findings to be externally valid across other human-capital based 
contexts. Examples may include academia, film, and software industries. As the economy 
becomes increasingly dependent on an individual’s talent, there is a growing need to 
understand the micro-level processes behind some fundamental phenomena, including 






CHAPTER III: THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST: CAREER IMPRINTS AND 
ENTREPRENERUSHIP CHOICES
Abstract 
 In this chapter, I examine the impact of an individual’s early career experiences 
on entrepreneurship choices. Whereas past work has documented the influence of career 
histories on entrepreneurial entry (e.g. Boeker, 1988; Brittian and Freeman, 1986; Carroll 
and Mosakowski, 1987; Higgins, 2005; Shane and Khurana, 2003), the question of 
whether and how formative experiences influence the direction in which organizational 
members choose to exploit their innovative ideas has received less attention. Moreover, 
past research has largely focused on the imminent characteristics of past employer to 
predict the probability of entrepreneurial transition; in contrast, I suggest that conditions 
present at the incipient stage of an individual’s career, which I term career imprints, 
leave an indelible mark that continues to affect one’s decisions and behaviors today. 
Specifically, I argue that an exposure to risk, discretion and entrepreneurial coworkers, 
early in one’s career, increases the propensity of external rather than internal venture 
formation. As expected, career imprints have an effect on the future choice of 
entrepreneurial activity; I find that an early career exposure to risk increases the 
probability that nascent entrepreneurs deploy their efforts outside rather than inside. 






outside are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship in the future. Interestingly, higher 
rates of coworker-founded internal ventures do not predict an individual’s entry into 
intrapreneurship. The imprinting effect is partially mitigated by a negative feedback (i.e., 
an actor’s low performance), which suggests that adaptive learning is an integral part of 
the imprinting mechanism. Together, findings in the present study provide evidence that 
formative environments factor into an actor’s decision-making model and that they 
should be considered to enrich the understanding of entrepreneurial choices.   
Introduction 
A well-established stream of research in sociology, organization theory, and 
entrepreneurship has related entrepreneurial transition to early career histories of 
potential entrepreneurs. There is ample evidence to suggest that entrepreneurial entry is 
influenced by educational and professional experiences that occur prior to a new venture 
founding (e.g., Boeker, 1988; Brittian and Freeman, 1986; Carroll and Mosakowski, 
1987; Haveman and Cohen, 1994; Higgins, 2005; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Shane and 
Khurana, 2003). A theme in this literature indicates that entrepreneurs are ―organizational 
products‖ (Freeman, 1986) in that organizations provide a social setting, in which to 
acquire a range of resources that enable the identification and the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. For example, past employers procure their would-be 
entrepreneurs with information (Freeman, 1986; Romanelli, 1989; Shane and Khurana, 
2003), help build skills and social capital (e.g., Burton, Sørensen and Beckman 2002; 






ability to found new organizations (Shane and Khurana, 2003; Sorenson and Audia, 
2000). While organizations are considered as ―breeding grounds‖ for entrepreneurs, 
certain organizational characteristics may hinder entrepreneurial transition. For example, 
a well-established finding relates organizational size, age, and the degree of 
bureaucratization to a lower probability of entrepreneurial entry, as these characteristics 
correlate with a limited exposure of organizational members to entrepreneurial 
opportunities (e.g., Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005; 
Sørensen, 2007a).  
Although the theoretical and empirical link between an organizational context and 
entrepreneurial transition has been well established, the majority of studies consider only 
the imminent organizational characteristics and rarely examine the conditions present 
earlier in one’s career. This neglect in the literature obscures our understanding of 
entrepreneurial processes for at least three reasons. First, the current theories have not 
taken into consideration inter-organizational mobility, even though talented workers 
move across organizations over the course of their careers, gaining exposure to a range of 
organizational practices, routines, and norms (Boeker, 1997; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973; 
Sørensen, 1999). Because highly mobile knowledge workers may work for multiple 
employers during their careers, our theoretical frameworks should incorporate the 
characteristics of both the incipient and recent employers. 
 Second, the existing accounts make an implicit assumption about the stability of 






and innovation, organizations constantly change to adjust to the demands of the external 
environment (e.g., Eccles, Nohria and Berkley, 1992; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Scott, 
1995; Weick and Quinn, 1999). In these fast-changing organizational environments, 
actors are likely to gain an exposure to an array of organizational characteristics, even if 
working for only one employer throughout their careers. Because early career 
experiences are likely to differ from the recent ones, both should be considered, when 
studying the impact of career histories on entrepreneurial decisions.  
To examine the impact of formative experiences on entrepreneurship choices, I 
use a conceptual framework of social imprinting. Studies in sociology and social 
psychology have documented that formative experiences and founding conditions carry 
over to the later stages of an individual’s career (e.g., Boeker, 1988; Fiske and Taylor, 
1991; Stinchcombe, 1965). Specifically, research on social imprinting suggests that social 
actors have their cognitive schemata molded by formative experiences, which continue to 
guide one’s future behaviors and decisions (e.g., Hall, 2004; Higgins, 2005). Based on 
this theory, I argue that an individual’s formative career experiences will impact the 
choice between the pursuit of internal versus external ventures, shaping the nascent 
entrepreneurs’ preferences, belief structures, and skills.   
The present study builds upon and contributes to the work on career histories and 
entrepreneurial process (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; Higgins, 2005; Higgins and Gulati, 
2003; Shane and Khurana, 2003). In contrast to other studies, focused on entrepreneurial 






decision to exploit an innovative idea either internally or externally. While previous 
studies have largely focused on understanding the characteristics of an imminent 
employer to predict the probability of entrepreneurial transition, I expand the current 
frameworks by taking into account organizational environments, experienced by an actor 
early in their career. More broadly, by specifying the imprinting conditions critical to the 
entrepreneurship choices, the study enriches our understanding of the micro-level 
mechanisms underlying the critical notion of organization’s boundaries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the 
theoretical framework that examines how entrepreneurship choices are influenced by 
conditions present at formative stages of an individual’s career. This section is followed 
by a section describing the methodology, sample, and variables. The subsequent section 
presents the main results, and several robustness checks. Finally, I discuss the 
implications and contributions in the concluding section. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Career Imprints and Entrepreneurship Choices 
Much evidence can be marshaled to support the claim that formative experiences 
and founding conditions cast a lasting imprint that continues to shape individuals and 
organizations over time (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965). Social psychologists, for example, 
argue that belief structures and mind-sets are most susceptible to an influence during the 
incipient stages of the development. Conditions present during such stages contribute to 






concepts, events and entities (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). They help individuals orient 
themselves within their experiential terrain (Weick, 1979), leading to the utilization of 
knowledge that has already been stored.      
 Building on the imprinting logic, career scholars have further related the 
formation of professional norms, beliefs, and values to the developmental stages in one’s 
career (e.g., Hall, 2004; Higgins, 2004; 2005); professional training or the nature of a 
work environment, early in the career, can cast an imprint on a social actor to guide his or 
her future behavior in the profession. Once the cognitive schemas and basic concepts 
have been developed, incoming information will be assimilated into the already existing 
knowledge structures. For example, Higgins (2004) argues that, at an early stage in their 
careers, young leaders are particularly vulnerable to the influence of the expectations and 
behaviors of others. Similarly, Bercovitz and Feldman (2006) find that individuals trained 
at institutions where the participation in technology transfer was actively practiced, 
adopted similar practices later in their careers. Sociologists of work have further 
documented that structural and technological changes would mark the experience and 
work trajectories of various cohorts in the labor force. For example, unemployment 
encoded and carried forward into the future, produced later effect on an individual’s 
career trajectory (Abbott, 2005). Consistently, Ryder (1965) finds that various cohorts 
share cohort-specific differences resulting from common patterns of material resources, 
and similar social, political, economic, and labor force experiences. In his labor market 






individual’s entry into the labor market influence long-term outcomes, such as 
promotions patterns or future wages. Applied to the context of entrepreneurship choices, 
the imprinting logic suggests that conditions present at an early stage of an individual’s 
career, will carry over into the future to affect the decision regarding internal versus 
external entrepreneurship.         
 If early career experiences influence entrepreneurship choices, the question arises 
as to the theoretical mechanisms operating behind this process. While a range of different 
mechanisms may be present, I build on the existing entrepreneurship literature to 
distinguish two main channels through which social imprinting should affect 
entrepreneurship choices: (1) an exposure to the social environment, and (2) an exposure 
the technical environment of the organization. This logic is based on the emerging line of 
inquiry that relates the transition to entrepreneurship to the attributes of a social context, 
in which entrepreneurs operate (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; 
Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987; Saxenian, 1990; Shane, 2003). Broadly, research in this 
tradition suggests that the identification and the pursuit of opportunities for new ventures 
are contingent on the properties of the context. For example, peers define the 
informational and normative environments within which individuals reach the decision to 
become entrepreneurs (Nanda and Sorensen, 2008), while social capital facilitates 
entrepreneurial entry by structuring the opportunities and helping the acquisition of 
resources (e.g., Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Burt, 1992; Higgins, 2005). Because social 






entrepreneurship, I argue that both should affect entrepreneurial choice. Building on the 
entrepreneurship literature and the theories of social imprinting, I thus suggest that 
entrepreneurship decisions will be affected by (a) the past choices of coworkers, and (b) 
the amount of discretion and risk experienced at the onset of a social actor’s career.  
Coworkers’ Influence 
 Building on the literature that documents the impact of a social context on 
entrepreneurial entry (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2006), I argue that certain attributes of the 
social context at an early stage of the career, affect later decisions regarding the  
exploitation of novel ideas. Specifically, I focus on one aspect of the social environment 
– socialization with coworkers - and argue that early career exposure to coworkers will 
have a profound effect on the subsequent decisions regarding entrepreneurial choices. 
Coworkers may influence an individual’s future behaviors in several ways. First, 
coworkers are likely to transmit norms and beliefs about the profession to newcomers 
(Ashforth and Saks, 1996; Merton and Rossi, 1957; Schein, 1983). For example, in her 
essay on leadership, Higgins (2004) argues that, at the early career stage, individuals are 
particularly vulnerable to the belief structures and norms held and communicated by 
coworkers. Norms acquired through coworker socialization have been further shown to 
impact a range of an individual’s career-related choices, including the decision to engage 
in technology transfer (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008), and in a range of other activities in 
the scientific community (Kenney and Goe, 2004; Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, and Stoto, 






external entrepreneurship through his or her coworkers. Second, an early career 
interaction with coworkers may profoundly contribute to the formation of an individual’s 
skills. Social learning theories point to ―similar others‖ as a valuable source of new 
knowledge and skills in the profession (Bandura, 1986; Duflo and Saez, 2000). Because 
one’s coworkers often act as referents, nascent entrepreneurs are likely to acquire new 
skills and insights by observing the choices of their coworkers. Finally, coworkers may 
provide socio-emotional and instrumental resources (e.g., advice, other contacts) that 
allow to identify and pursue opportunities for either internal or external ventures.  
Based on this logic, I argue that, as individuals become socialized into 
organizations with a high prevalence of coworker-founded internal ventures, they will be 
more likely to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities inside. Conversely, a higher rate of 
external coworker-founded ventures should increase the probability that a nascent 
entrepreneur founds a new venture outside. This leads to the following set of hypotheses:    
Hypothesis 1a: Higher rates of internal coworker-founded ventures in the actor’s 
early career increase the probability that the entrepreneur will found a new 
venture inside in the future.  
Hypothesis 1b: Higher rates of external coworker-founded ventures in the actor’s 
early career increase the probability that the entrepreneur will found a new 
venture outside in the future.  
Risk and Discretion  
In addition to the properties of the social context and the coworkers’ past 
decisions more specifically, entrepreneurship choices may be affected by the 
organization’s technical environment. Based on the literature investigating the 






in the parent organization as the properties of the technical environment relevant to 
entrepreneurship choices.  
The literature defines risk as ―the degree to which managers are willing to make 
commitments associated with a reasonable chance of costly failures‖ (Miller and Friesen, 
1978: 923). There is ample evidence suggesting that tolerance for risk increases the 
probability of entrepreneurial entry (e.g., Khilstrom and Laffont, 1979; Knight, 1921; 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Compared to a general population, 
entrepreneurs have been shown to frame situations in terms of opportunities rather than 
risks (Sarasvathy, Simon and Lave, 1998), and to have a higher risk-taking propensity, 
and lower uncertainty avoidance (Drucker, 1995; Stewart and Roth, 2001). Although 
other studies have found no differences (e.g., Palich and Bagby, 1995), there exists 
nevertheless considerable empirical evidence to document the role of risk-taking 
propensity in facilitating entrepreneurial transition.  
Because the decision to pursue innovative ideas internally versus externally is 
associated with varying degrees of risk, risk would naturally factor into choice between 
inside and outside venture formation. Burgelman (1983) suggests that an internal venture 
development involves reputational and career risk, as managers are attracted by the 
perceived opportunity to become a general manager of an important new business in the 
corporation. However, the parent company may reallocate a failed entrepreneur to 
another task (Scharfstein and Gromb, 2002), thereby reducing the amount of risk 






responsible for identifying and accessing indispensible resources, when leaving to found 
external ventures; therefore, external entrepreneurship is inevitably associated with 
higher uncertainty and the labor market risk. Consequently, actors with a stronger 
preference for risk should pursue entrepreneurial opportunities outside rather than inside. 
 In addition to risk, the entrepreneurial choice may be influenced by the desire for 
autonomy. Existing work has linked the probability of a new venture formation to an 
individual’s need for autonomy and control (Halaby 2003; Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002), where autonomy indicates an independent action of an 
individual who creates an idea or a vision for a new product (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). 
Because internal and external ventures are associated with varying amounts of discretion 
conferred upon the founder, discretion represents a relevant aspect of the choice between 
internal and external entrepreneurship. Internally formed ventures impose a greater 
constraint on the founder, as intrapreneurs share the decision-making power with their 
employers. By contrast, external ventures provide entrepreneurs with more discretion, 
since the founders often become the owners of a new venture.    
 An exposure to discretion and risk in the organization at early stages in one’s 
career may affect subsequent entrepreneurship choices in several ways. First, an exposure 
to risk and discretion may contribute to the formation of an individual’s values and 
beliefs. Previous literature has provided ample evidence to establish the link between 
individuals’ beliefs and values and entry to entrepreneurship (e.g., McClelland and 






studies have emphasized an actor’s risk-aversion (Knight, 1921), or the need for 
achievement (McClelland, 1961) to explain the decision to enter entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, individuals exposed to risk and discretion in the organization early in their 
careers, are more likely to develop skills that require an ability to manage higher risk and 
greater discretion.         
 Consequently, an early career exposure to risk and discretion- which I term 
imprinted risk and imprinted discretion respectively – will influence one’s propensity to 
pursue entrepreneurial opportunities externally rather than internally. Specifically, an 
exposure to lower amounts of risk early in the career should increase the probability of 
internal more than external foundings, as imprinted individuals do not learn to manage 
risk and/or develop risk-averse preferences. Conversely, an exposure to greater risk early 
in the career will increase the probability of external more than internal founding, given 
that imprinted risk contributes to the formation of risk-favorable beliefs and skills to 
manage risk. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2: Imprinted risk will increase the probability of an external venture 
founding in the future, where imprinted risk represents the risk associated with 
tasks performed in the organization early in the actor’s career. 
Similar to risk preferences, an early exposure to discretion, which I term 
imprinted discretion, will enhance the formation of an individual’s preferences for and/or 
skills to manage discretion and autonomy. Thus, individuals equipped with discretionary 
powers early in their careers, should pursue external rather than internal ventures in the 






career stages, will develop weaker preferences for discretion, and be more prone to 
pursue internal rather than external opportunities for new ventures. Hence, I hypothesize 
that:   
Hypothesis 3: Imprinted discretion will increase the probability of an external 
venture founding in the future, where imprinted discretion represents the 
discretion associated with tasks performed in the organization early in the actor’s 
career. 
Adaptive Learning Effects 
When are nascent entrepreneurs most influenced by career imprints? I argue that 
the impact of career imprints on entrepreneurship choices is contingent upon an 
individual’s learning. Adaptive learning theories posit that social actors actively revise 
prior behaviors and adapt their future decisions to feedback (e.g., Levitt and March, 
1988; March and Olsen, 1975). In response to negative feedback from the external 
environment, individuals engage in adaptive learning that involves both behavioral and 
cognitive changes (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). In the context of the entrepreneurship choices, 
this theory implies that nascent entrepreneurs will make revisions in their beliefs and 
behaviors, when presented with negative feedback regarding the activities performed. 
Hence, individuals who receive negative feedback on the tasks high in discretion and risk 
early in the career, will be less likely to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities outside. 
Whereas feedback may take a variety of forms, one of its direct manifestations is an 
employee’s performance. Using the conceptual frame of adaptive learning, I therefore 






formation to be mitigated for less well performing managers. This leads to the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4a: The impact of imprinted risk on the entrepreneurship choice will 
be weaker for less well performing actors. 
Hypothesis 4b: The impact of imprinted discretion on the entrepreneurship 
choice will be weaker for less well performing actors. 
Methods and Analyses 
Sampling 
I use a sample of all mutual funds from the CRSP US Mutual Fund. The data 
available via CRSP are survivor-bias free, as they include information on both live and 
defunct funds. This study uses data collected for the period between 1979 and 2006, since 
the mutual fund industry grew rapidly over that period. The entire data amount to 8,313 
unique funds and 8,014 unique fund managers – for the total of 569,946 month-manger 
observations. For the purpose of my study, the population of interest includes solely 
entrepreneurial portfolio managers – those who created new ventures either internally or 
externally.
10
 I further use the TASS Database on hedge funds to crosscheck the names of 
portfolio managers and identify fund managers who left to start hedge fund families. The 
TASS Database tracks information on live and defunct hedge funds, and is free of 
survivorship bias. It provides the names of managers in charge of a given fund, as well as 
a set of financial characteristics, including monthly net asset value, fund inception date, 
and investment objectives. Managers whose name appears in both databases are 
                                                        






identified as those who depart from the mutual fund industry to start up a hedge fund 
company. I merge the CRSP and TASS data sets by the unique names of portfolio 
managers, including the first and the last name, and the middle initial. To further ensure 
identification, I check if the data on manager’s appearance in the TASS database 
coincides with the date they last appear in the CRSP data base, and the date that a new 
hedge fund company is created. I supplement quantitative analyses with the semi-
structured and informal but relevant interviews on a convenience sample of twenty-five 
fund managers. The interviewees were asked about the processes of internal and external 
fund formation, as well as the role of the school ties in shaping entrepreneurial choices of 
fund managers. These interviews provide support to my argument that fund managers, 
indeed, face the choices described above, and that their informal ties to school colleagues 
play an important role in affecting those choices. 
Fund Manager Data 
I collect data on managerial characteristics and career histories from several 
different sources. Part of the data is obtained from the Morningstar Mutual Funds OnDisc 
database that provides a list of managers, including names of all current and past 
managers, the dates when their tenures began and ended, and some biographic data, 
including academic institutions attended and managers’ dates of graduation. A possible 
problem with the Morningstar database is that it reports data starting 1990 and provides 
biographic data for less than half of the universe of mutual fund managers, raising a 






hand-collected data. First, I supplement the list of fund managers with data obtained via 
CRSP. I further consult the Nelson directories on U.S. mutual funds that report extensive 
data on managers, mutual funds, and fund families. Additionally, I use multiple Internet 
sources, including publicly available SEC filings, mutual fund websites, and on-line 
career search engines (i.e., Zabasearch, LinkedIn, and ZoomInfo). Combining this set of 
different resources, I am able to obtain an extensive list of portfolio managers, dates of 
their tenures in each fund, year of each manager’s birth, manager’s gender, undergraduate 
and graduate institutions attended, and the year when the manager obtained a degree at 
each of the institutions attended. 
Dependent Variables  
External vs. Internal Choice. For each portfolio manager that forms a new 
venture, I create a variable equal to 1 if a new venture is created externally, and 0 if 
internally. External venture creation is defined as a departure of the fund manager to set 
up an external fund family that did not exist prior to the manager’s departure. By 
contrast, internal fund creation involves opening a new fund inside the parent fund 
family. To mitigate the concern that the manager could be hired to supervise an internally 
created fund, I focus solely on those managers who have been employed by the family 
prior to the creation of the new fund within that family. Funds ―outsourced‖ to an 
independent management company are excluded from the sample since it is unclear 
whether they should be classified as internally or externally founded. The variable is 







Although little theoretical guidance exists to demarcate the ―imprinting period,‖ I 
consider the first year of an individual’s career as a relevant window of his or her 
formative experience, based on the anecdotal and research evidence suggesting the 
importance of the first year in the professional development (Higgins, 2004). I further 
perform the sensitivity analysis and find the results to be robust up to two years since the 
commencement of one’s career.  
Coworkers’ Influence. To measure the coworkers’ impact on entrepreneurship 
choices, I aggregate the number of internal ventures created by the focal manager’s 
coworkers within the first year of the manager’s career in the mutual fund industry. 
Similarly, I create a measure that sums external coworker-founded ventures. Both 
variables are time-invariant. For robustness, I divide the count of internally and externally 
coworker-founded ventures by the number of total coworkers in the firm. The results are 
robust to the alternative specification.  
Imprinted Risk. Risk is operationalized as the standard deviation of manager’s 
performance - to account for the extent to which the manager’s stock choices diverge 
from the typical choices in the industry. To account for imprinting, I calculate the average 
amount of risk present in the firm during the manager’s first year in the career. The 
measure is time-invariant.   
Imprinted Discretion.  Discretion is defined as the amount of decision-making 






managers have diffused decision-making processes and provide any single manager with 
less control over important decisions, such as the selection of stocks to buy or to sell. I 
first construct a variable that is equal to 1 divided by the number of co- managers 
supervising the focal fund for each manager in the firm. The measure takes values from 0 
to 1, where higher values indicate that the focal manager has fewer co-managers and is, 
therefore, endowed with greater discretion.
11
 To account for imprinting, for each portfolio 
manager, I calculate the average amount of discretion in the parent company during the 
first year of the manager’s career. The measure is time-invariant.  
Adaptive Learning. I measure manager’s performance to proxy for the feedback. 
I use monthly total fund returns available via CRSP. Because portfolio managers are 
evaluated based on their skills to pick and sell stocks, fund return serves as the most 
direct measure of manager’s performance. To account for negative performance, I create 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the manager’s performance falls into the bottom quartile 
in a given year and 0 otherwise. To allow for the market response to come into effect, I 
forward the performance measure one year into the future.  
Control Variables 
 Recent Conditions. I control for a range of the recent organizational 
characteristics, one year prior to entrepreneurial choice. For each ―imprinting‖ variable, I 
construct a corresponding variable measured one year prior to the entrepreneur’s choice. 
Specifically, for imprinted risk, I include a measure of risk one year prior to an 
                                                        







entrepreneurial choice. For imprinted discretion, I include a measure of discretion in the 
organization one year prior to the manager’s entrepreneurial decision. The measures vary 
monthly.  
I further control for various manager-specific characteristics that may influence 
the choice between internal and external venture formation. To that end, I account for 
manager’s demographics, such as gender and age. Gender is inferred from the managers’ 
first name and coded as 1 if male and 0 if female. I use various Internet search engines, 
such as the Zoominfo database and the on-line SEC filings to identify the masculine 
(―Mr.)‖ or the feminine (―Ms.‖) prefix for names with no clear corresponding gender. To 
account for age, I hand-collect data on the fund manager’s dates of birth using various 
Internet search engines (e.g., LinkedIn, Zoominfo), and the existing databases (e.g., 
Morningstar and Nelson Directory of Investment Managers). 
I further include various measures of human capital because the decision 
regarding the new venture locus may be influenced by managerial skills and talent. Past 
research has suggested that the risk of entrepreneurial transition increases with an 
individual’s career experience, as individuals acquire resources and skills conducive to 
founding a new business (e.g., Higgins, 2005; Romanelli, 1989; Sorenson and Audia, 
2000). Consequently, I control for the manager’s industry tenure by counting the number 
of months the manager appears in the database. For robustness, I include a measure of 






In addition, I account for manager’s performance. Prior research has documented 
that high performing knowledge workers found new organizations to derive returns on 
their human capital (Groysberg, Nanda, and Prats, 2007). I therefore expect that, 
compared to their counterparts, higher performing fund managers will tend to leave in 
pursuit of external ventures, as opposed to creating new funds inside. I measure 
manager’s performance using monthly total fund returns available via CRSP – a standard 
performance measure used in the finance literature.  
Moreover, I include a variable to account for size of the fund supervised by the 
focal manager. For managers who supervise more than one fund, an averaged fund size is 
calculated. Because fund’s size indicates manager’s ability to attract investment, I expect 
that portfolio managers who supervise bigger funds are better performers more likely to 
leave to create new organizations, as opposed to developing new ventures internally.    
Furthermore, I control for the focal manager’s human capital by including a 
measure of her formal education. Because nascent entrepreneurs with deeper educational 
backgrounds should have greater human capital, they may be more likely to create 
independent ventures, as opposed to deploying their entrepreneurial efforts inside the 
parent organization. Educational attainment is coded 1 if the focal manager received a 
bachelor’s degree (BBA, or BA/BS), 2 if the manager eared MBA, MA/MS, or JD, and 3 
if the manager obtained a PhD degree. In addition, I control formally for elite school 
education. Because elite schools graduates have been documented to more likely advance 






systematically exposed to differential opportunities regarding new venture creation. To 
measure elite school education, I create a binary variable equal 1 if the focal manager 
attended an Ivy League or received a degree from a non-Ivy League but an elite 
institution.
12
 For robustness, I create a measure of Ivy League institutions only, and 
obtain similar results (unreported). 
Another group of control variables takes into account firm-specific context that 
may affect entrepreneurship choices. Specifically, I account for organizational age, size 
and performance. Prior literature has shown that older and bigger organizations provide 
exposure to fewer entrepreneurial opportunities and that they equip organizational 
members with limited skills to create independent ventures (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; 
Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005; Sørensen 2007a). Consequently, I expect that 
individuals socialized in older and larger organizations will be less likely to develop 
external ventures. By contrast, larger and older organizations may offer more 
opportunities for internal venture formation (Schumpeter, 1950). To measure firm size, I 
use total assets under management, which represents a commonly used measure of fund 
family’s size. For robustness, I include a count of all managers employed by the fund 
family. To measure firm age, I use the CRSP database to derive the age of the oldest fund 
in the family.  
 I further account for fund family performance. On the one hand, better 
performing organizations may equip their entrepreneurs with resources that facilitate the 
                                                        
12 Based on the Useem and Karabel’s (1986) list of elite schools, I consider Stanford, Northwestern, 
University of Michigan, University of California- Berkeley, University of California-Los Angeles, New 






formation of independent ventures. For instance, Burton, Sørensen and Beckman (2002) 
find that entrepreneurs benefit from reputational and informational resources provided by 
their prior employers. On the other hand, highly performing organizations may be able to 
allocate more resources towards internal venture formation and provide their members 
with opportunities for internal venture formation. Firm performance is calculated as the 
average fund return for the focal fund family using a value-weighted approach. The 
value-weighted approach captures the total return by multiplying each family’s return by 
its relative size in the family, and by taking the sum across all weighted fund returns 
inside the firm.  
Finally, I control for market uncertainty. Because creating a new venture is 
associated with higher risk and uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Venkataraman, 1997), the 
probability of external entrepreneurship should decrease with unfavorable market 
conditions. Compared to external, internal ventures are associated with lower degree of 
risk, as the company is likely to cushion potential risk of failure by reallocating the failed 
entrepreneur to another task (Scharfstein and Gromb, 2002). Hence, under greater market 
uncertainty, entrepreneurial managers should deploy their efforts to create internal rather 
than external funds. I create the measure of market uncertainty using a financial formula 
to calculate market volatility for period t (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001).
13
 
Empirical Analyses      
                                                        
13 I use the following formula to calculate market volatility:  MKTt= σ²mt ∑ (Rms- µm) ² where µm is defined 






I use logistic regression models to estimate the effect of formative experiences on 
the decision to exploit innovative ideas either internally or externally. To address 
concerns related to unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation, firm-random effects 
are used. Because the logistic model excludes time-invariant variables when models with 
fixed effects are estimated, I use random effects. For robustness, I include manager-
random effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level. To control 
for economy-wide fluctuations, I include time-fixed effects. I further try to mitigate the 
problem of cross-sectional correlation, by clustering standard errors by the manager or 









where Oijt is equal to 1 if the new venture is developed outside the fund family, and 0 if it 
is developed inside, 
 j
are school-fixed effects, 
 i
are firm-random effects, 
 t
are time-
fixed effects, X is the vector of the explanatory variables, and F(.) is the logistic function.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The total sample 
consists of 8,014 managers, of which more than a half (56%) create a new venture either 
internally or externally. This suggests that out of 8,014 portfolio managers, 3501 never 
engage in an entrepreneurial effort. Of those who self-select to entrepreneurship, 84% 






outside. Overall, the average fund manager is 44.6 years old and has 5.5 years of 
professional experience, which suggests that most fund managers have previous work 
experience before they begin to supervise a fund. Fund managers have, on average, 1.7 
educational degrees. Interestingly, only 15% of all fund managers are females. The 
average size of the fund family is $40 billion and varies between $1 million and $1106 
billion, and the average fund is 29 years old. 
                                                  ------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.1 about here 
                                                 ------------------------------------------- 
Career Imprints: Multivariate Analysis 
Table 3.2 presents the results estimated using logistic regression models to test the 
hypothesized effect of coworkers’ past decisions on entrepreneurial choices. Model (1) 
includes the measure of coworkers’ choices one year prior to the choice of the focal 
entrepreneur; it shows that the probability of internal rather than external venture 
formation increases with the number of coworkers who recently started internal funds. 
Model (2) tests the hypothesized relation between the coworkers’ choices in the 
imprinting period and the manager’s future entrepreneurship choices. The results show no 
empirical support for Hypothesis 1a, indicating that the rates of internal ventures founded 
by coworkers in the first year of one’s career do not affect the future choice between 
internal and external venture formation. Models (3)-(4) report the results regarding the 






estimates for the influence of coworkers’ choices made one year prior to the decision of 
the focal entrepreneur. A positive coefficient on the main variable indicates that potential 
entrepreneurs are more likely to found new ventures externally, when their coworkers 
pursued outside ventures last year. Model (4) adds the imprinting variable; the results 
provide support for Hypothesis 1b, suggesting that higher rates of coworker-founded 
external ventures increase an individual’s propensity to found new ventures outside rather 
than inside the parent organization. 
                                               ------------------------------------------ 
  Insert Table 3.2 about here 
   ------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.3 presents the results estimated using logistic regression models to 
examine the hypothesized relation between the values (i.e., risk and discretion), imprinted 
on individuals during formative career stages, and the entrepreneurship choices. Model 
(1) shows the estimates for the impact of risk experienced by the manager one year prior 
to the entrepreneurial decision. A positive coefficient suggests that an exposure to risk 
increases the probability of an external rather than internal venture formation. Model (2) 
tests the hypothesis that imprinted risk should influence the future entrepreneurship 
choice in favor of the pursuit of innovative ideas outside. A positive coefficient on the 
imprinting measure indicates that fund managers are more prone to found new ventures 
externally, when imprinted with risk. Model (3) presents the estimates for a recent 






exposure one year prior to the entrepreneurship choice and the manager’s decision to 
create an external venture. Model (4) accounts for the imprinting mechanisms. The 
coefficient on the imprinted discretion is insignificant, suggesting that imprinted 
discretion does not factor into one’s future decision regarding entrepreneurship.   
------------------------------------------ 
        Insert Table 3.3 about here 
         ------------------------------------------- 
Together, findings presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide some support for the 
impact of career imprints on an individual’s entrepreneurship choices. As suggested, 
formative experiences influence the choice of an entrepreneurial activity via (1) an 
exposure to coworkers, and (2) risk and discretion in the organizational environment. The 
results demonstrate that the influence of coworkers’ choices, early in an actor’s career, 
holds solely for external ventures. By contrast, coworkers who pursued their ideas 
internally have no impact on the direction of the actor’s future entrepreneurial choices. 
Finally, the hypothesized influence of imprinted discretion on the entrepreneurship 
choices received no support.         
 The results presented in Table 3.4 further report the effect of adaptive learning. 
Model (1) examines the hypothesized mitigating role of the low manager’s performance 
on the relation between imprinted risk and the propensity to create a new venture 
externally. Contrary to the prediction, the coefficient on the interaction term is 






relation between imprinted discretion and the entrepreneurship choices. The results 
provide support for Hypothesis 4b, indicating that performance moderates the influence 
of imprinted discretion on the direction in which potential entrepreneurs choose to deploy 
their efforts. Specifically, I find that the impact of imprinted discretion on managerial 
propensity to found an external venture is mitigated for worse performers. This may 
suggest that upon receiving negative feedback on tasks high in discretionary powers, 
portfolio managers less likely to strive for autonomy and control later in their careers. 
Overall, these results provide partial support for the hypothesized impact of adaptive 
learning on the relation between career imprints and the entrepreneurial decisions.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Alternative Explanations: Imprinting or Selection?     
 Although the theoretical framework presented in this paper suggests that early 
career experiences affect the choice between internal and external venture formation 
through the imprinting mechanisms, certain challenges need to be addressed. First, one 
could argue that a correlation between organizational characteristics and the 
entrepreneurship choices is spurious. A critical view may suggest that the observed 
imprinting characteristics of organizations proxy for differences in individual dispositions 
regarding entry to entrepreneurship. This would imply that individuals with different 






individuals will be more likely to self-select into low-risk work environments and low-
risk tasks.           
 Whereas accounting for sorting processes in entrepreneurship is difficult and 
rarely achieved (e.g., Nanda and Sørensen, 2007; Sørensen, 2007a), I try to rule out the 
potentially spurious correlations in several ways. First, in the empirical models, I account 
for the imminent characteristics of the parent organization. If the observed correlations 
are driven by selection, individuals with certain traits should consistently self-select to 
organizations that match such traits. For example, risk-averse actors should consistently 
perform low-risk tasks. By including a control for most recent organizational 
characteristics, I offer a conservative test of the imprinting theory. If selection accounts 
for the observed correlations, recent organizational characteristics will be perfectly 
correlated with the past characteristics– consistent with the claim that individuals self-
select into certain types of organizations that match their time-invariant preferences and 
traits. In this case, the estimates would be biased against any findings. However, to 
further address the possibility that the estimated career imprints are biased by unobserved 
heterogeneity in fixed individual characteristics, I adopt a random-effects strategy. Due to 
a nonlinear nature of the logistic function, manager-fixed effects would lead to an 
exclusion from the sample of those managers who only make one entrepreneurship 
choice, internal or external, over the course of their careers. Because such exclusion 






heterogeneity at the manager level. The results, reported in Table A1 (see Appendix), are 
robust to the inclusion of manager-random effects. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 At the core of this chapter is the claim that impressionable experiences imprint 
individuals with a set of beliefs, norms, and skills that carry over to the future and impact 
the choices individuals make regarding entry into entrepreneurship. Specifically, the 
theoretical framework proposed in the study posits that formative experiences will affect 
the direction of entrepreneurial efforts via (1) the social environment of coworkers, and 
(2) an exposure to discretion and risk in the organization. Although the empirical results 
did not provide support to all hypothesized relations, the general pattern indicates that 
career imprints are central to our understanding of the entrepreneur’s decision-making 
model. Imprinted risk, which indicates an early career exposure to risk, increases the 
probability of a transition to entrepreneurship outside rather than inside. Moreover, 
portfolio managers exposed to higher rates of coworker-founded external ventures are 
more likely to form new ventures outside, consistent with the studies that document the 
role of peer effects in facilitating entrepreneurial transition (e.g., Nanda and Sørensen, 
2008). However, the choices of coworkers are influential only with respect to externally 
founded ventures. A plausible explanation for this finding may be that portfolio managers 
are affected by their coworkers’ choices only in respect to more deviant courses of action. 
Because external venture formation is less frequent in the profession, the knowledge and 






central to the decision to exploit a new idea externally.      
 One surprising finding is that the mechanisms of adaptive learning received only 
weak empirical support. The theories of adaptive learning (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988; 
March and Olsen, 1975) predict that the impact of career choices on entrepreneurship 
decisions should be contingent on the feedback that an actor receives in response to his or 
her actions. However, the empirical results provide only partial support to this 
hypothesis; I find that negative feedback – operationalized as low performance of the 
portfolio manager – does not mitigate the effect of imprinted risk on entrepreneurial 
decisions. By contrast, consistent with my prediction, the impact of imprinted discretion 
on entrepreneurship choices is weaker for lower performers.    
 By examining the impact of the career imprints on entrepreneurship choices, this 
chapter makes a contribution to several research streams. First, my findings contribute to 
a richer understanding of how career histories affect entrepreneurial process (e.g., 
Boeker, 1988; Brittian and Freeman, 1986; Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987; Haveman and 
Cohen, 1994; Higgins, 2005; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Shane and Khurana, 2003). 
Whereas prior research has largely focused on most recent conditions of the parent 
organization to predict entrepreneurial entry (e.g., Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 
2005; Higgins, 2005), my study documents the understudied role of formative 
experiences in affecting entrepreneurial processes. Specifically, I provide evidence that 
formative career stages imprint on nascent entrepreneurs certain belief structures, norms, 






models. Moreover, contributing to the emerging interest in the social environments and 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Nanda and Sørensen), I provide evidence that early career 
socialization with entrepreneurial coworkers has an enduring impact on entrepreneurial 
entry. Finally, whereas the existing literature has focused on understanding how career 
histories influence entrepreneurial transition (e.g., Higgins, 2005; Shane and Khurana, 
2003), and new ventures’ growth (e.g., Higgins and Gulati, 2003), the present chapter 
enriches our knowledge by documenting the impact of career histories on the decision to 
found a new venture either inside or outside the parent organization. Findings presented 
in this chapter indicate that, compared to their counterparts, individuals who choose to 
found new ventures externally were exposed early in their careers to higher risk, higher 
discretion, and higher rates of coworker-founded outside ventures. More broadly, by 
uncovering the imprinting mechanism behind an individual’s choice between internal and 
external entrepreneurship, the present research contributes to a deeper understanding of 
an individual’s role in shaping the boundaries of the organization. The set of current 
findings offers powerful evidence that individuals – through their formative histories 
often exogenous to the attributes of the parent organization –can redefine the boundaries 






Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics        
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
External vs. Internal Choice (1if external, 0 if 
internal) 0.160 0.366 0 1 
Internal ventures founded by coworkers early in the 
actor’s career  0.002 0.024 0 1 
External ventures founded by coworkers early in the 
actor’s career  0.002    0.024 0 1 
Imprinted Risk (first year) 0.036 0.026 0 0.192 
Imprinted Discretion (first year) 0.872 0.228 0.1 1 
Performance Dummy (=1 for lowest performance 
quartile) 0.243 0.429 0 1 
Manager’s Discretion (1/fund co-managers’ count) 0.654 0.305 0.04 1 
Manager’s Compensation (Assets*Expense Ratio) 18.63 52.04 
0.012
2 665.1 
Manager’s Gender (1 if male)  0.855 0.305 0 1 
Manager’s Age 44.6 9.9 20 86 
Manager’s Performance (Fund return) 0.007 0.0334 -0.297 0.359 
Fund Size (Total Assets) 1090.932 3876.915 .001 121527.3 
Industry Tenure (Months) 50.97 51.74 1 375 
Elite School Degree (0-1) 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Highest Degree Earned 1.7 0.521 1 3 
Firm Size (Assets) 40,782.0 114,425. 0.036 1,097,76 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) 25.7 27.8 1 145 
Firm Performance (weighted family returns) 0.008 0.047 -0.891 1.623 
Firm Age (Oldest fund – month count) 28.67 21.47 1 81 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Internal ventures founded by 
coworkers (count) -93.299*** -92.993***   
 (9.308) (9.446)   
Internal ventures founded by 
coworkers early in the actor’s 
career (count)  1.765   
  (5.423)   




 14.857*** 13.344*** 
   (4.168) (4.204) 
External ventures founded by 
coworkers early in the actor’s 
career (count)    11.995*** 
    (1.428) 
Manager’s Discretion 0.236 0.218 0.184 0.064 
 (0.279) (0.282) (0.263) (0.267) 
Manager’s Compensation -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Manager's Gender 0.493 0.497 0.599* 0.565* 
 (0.352) (0.353) (0.324) (0.329) 
Manager's Age -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Manager’s Performance 13.309*** 14.472*** 16.209*** 15.488*** 
 (2.847) (2.958) (2.929) (2.952) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Elite School Degree -0.320 -0.341 -0.449 -0.450 
 (0.365) (0.368) (0.357) (0.358) 
Highest Degree Earned  -0.192 -0.206 -0.212 -0.146 
 (0.179) (0.182) (0.172) (0.175) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Performance  -0.832 -1.155 -0.327 0.311 





















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Age -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) 0.006 0.005 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market volatility -13.783** -13.610* -18.909*** -19.853*** 
 (6.954) (7.055) (6.631) (6.697) 
Firm-Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  20577 20557 20577 20577 






















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Risk (average) 25.505*** 22.698***   
 (4.947) (5.126)   
Imprinted Risk (average)  7.191*   
  (3.830)   
Firm Discretion (average)   1.904*** 1.958*** 
   (0.479) (0.527) 
Imprinted Discretion 
(average)    -0.099 
    (0.401) 
Manager's Discretion 0.205 0.198 -0.595* -0.586* 
 (0.267) (0.269) (0.339) (0.341) 
Manager's Compensation -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Manager's Gender 0.576* 0.574* 0.625* 0.622* 
 (0.326) (0.328) (0.327) (0.328) 
Manager's Age -0.021** -0.017* -0.022** -0.022** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Manager's Performance 15.216*** 15.386*** 16.302*** 16.289*** 
 (2.898) (2.933) (2.978) (2.978) 
Highest Degree Earned -0.248 -0.246 -0.193 -0.193 
 (0.175) (0.177) (0.173) (0.173) 
Elite School Degree -0.399 -0.294 -0.397 -0.409 
 (0.364) (0.367) (0.354) (0.357) 
Manager's Industry Tenure 0.004** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm's Performance -0.650 -0.536 -1.102 -1.073 
 (2.750) (2.768) (2.746) (2.748) 
Firm Age -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Fund Managers 
(Firm) 0.008** 0.008** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 
 















 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market volatility -21.543*** -22.297*** -19.437*** -19.390*** 
 (6.702) (6.815) (6.587) (6.588) 
Firm-Random Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20693 20673 20577 20577 






Table 3.4. The Effect of Adaptive Learning on the relation between Career Imprints and 
Entrepreneurship Choices 
Variables 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
 (1) (2) 
Imprinted Risk * Performance Dummy 7.616  
 (7.747)  
Imprinted Risk (average) 1.380  
 (6.368)  
Firm Risk (average) 22.625***  
 (5.150)  
Imprinted Discretion * Performance 
Dummy  -1.333* 
  (0.685) 
Imprinted Discretion (average)  0.909 
  (0.625) 
Firm Discretion (average)  1.898*** 
  (0.526) 
Manager’s Performance Dummy  -1.029*** 0.051 
 (0.370) (0.481) 
Manager's Discretion 0.216 -0.572* 
 (0.271) (0.342) 
Manager's Compensation -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Manager's Gender 0.582* 0.651** 
 (0.329) (0.328) 
Manager's Age -0.014 -0.018* 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Manager's Performance 14.282*** 14.871*** 
 (2.937) (2.967) 
Highest Degree Earned -0.215 -0.177 
 (0.178) (0.174) 
Elite School Degree -0.262 -0.342 
 (0.364) (0.353) 
Manager's Industry Tenure 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000** -0.000*** 






Table 3.4 (contd.). The Effect of Adaptive Learning on the relation between Career 
Imprints and Entrepreneurship Choices 
Variables 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
 (1) (2) 
Firm's Performance 0.069 -0.005 
 (2.773) (2.758) 
Firm's Age -0.020*** -0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) 0.009** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Market volatility -22.531*** -19.009*** 
 (6.856) (6.643) 
Firm-Random Effects Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 20555 20577 
Standard errors in parentheses   






CHAPTER IV: INFORMAL SOCIAL TIES AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
CHOICES
Abstract 
In this chapter, I propose that the entrepreneur’s choice between internal and 
external venture formation is affected by formal organizational structures (i.e., incentive 
systems) and informal social structure extending beyond the parent organization. Using 
unique data on the mutual fund industry over the period 1979-2006, I show that the 
parent organization induces internal venture formation by providing fund managers with 
higher compensation and greater discretion. However, the impact of incentives is limited 
by the fund manager’s informal social network of preexisting ties to her school 
colleagues. Specifically, I find that fund managers imitate previous entrepreneurship 
choices of other school network members. Additional analyses show that the effect of 
school ties is amplified by the spatial proximity of school network members, and is 
greater within same-gender school ties – providing support for inter-actor influences 
rather than common education. Together, the study offers a structural perspective on the 
choice between internal and external entrepreneurship and, therefore, the boundaries of 







Extensive sociological evidence exists to document the role of a social context in 
shaping the likelihood of entrepreneurial entry (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2007; Aldrich and 
Zimmer, 1986; Nanda and Sørensen, 2008; Shane, 2003; Thornton, 1999 for review). 
Within the sociological approaches, a body of knowledge has accumulated to explore the 
key role of social networks in facilitating the emergence and the development of new 
ventures (see Stuart and Sorenson, 2007 for review). Numerous studies have related the 
founders’ network position to a differential exposure to opportunities and resources 
central to new venture formation (e.g., Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Burt, 1992; Burt and 
Raider, 2002; Renzulli, Aldrich, and Moody, 2000). Despite the progress in the study of 
networks and entrepreneurship, we still know relatively little about the influence of social 
ties on the entrepreneur’s choice to found a new venture internally or leave to pursue 
opportunities outside. A better understanding of the theoretical link between the actor’s 
network position and his or her decision to stay put or leave is important not only for 
elucidating additional mechanisms behind entrepreneurial choices, but also for 
understanding the role of employees’ networks in shaping organizational-level 
phenomena, such as organizational boundaries.      
 The present chapter builds upon past efforts and addresses their limitations by 
trying to forward the understanding of the structural effects on the choice of 
entrepreneurial activity. The study’s main focus lies in understanding how the 
entrepreneurship choices are affected by an informal social structure, in which nascent 






structures (i.e., incentive systems), exercise only a limited influence over their members’ 
selection into either internal or external entrepreneurship. A core point for the argument 
is that individuals’ decisions are embedded in the informal social structure and influenced 
by social ties. Specifically, the study focuses on the role of school networks – social ties 
based on school affiliation – in shaping entrepreneurial outcomes, and proposes that 
variation in the characteristics of these networks impacts whether a new venture is 
formed inside or outside. Alumni networks represent a unique laboratory to examine the 
structural antecedents of organizational boundaries and document the role of informal 
social ties in determining how the conflicting choice between the entrepreneurial 
alternatives is made. More broadly, by examining the role of social networks in shaping 
the entrepreneurial choices, the present chapter contributes to a body of work focused on 
the relation between the properties of the founder’s networks and the entrepreneurship 
process (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Sorenson and Audia, 
2000; Stuart and Ding, 2006). However, in contrast to the existing studies largely focused 
on understanding the determinants of entrepreneurial transition, I establish a theoretical 
and empirical relation between informal social ties and entrepreneurship choices. 
Moreover, the present study represents one of the few to examine the joint impact of 
formal organizational structures and an informal social structure on the entry to 
entrepreneurship. More broadly, by specifying the structural conditions pertinent to the 
entrepreneurship choices, I provide additional evidence towards the role of social actors 






 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the 
theoretical framework that examines how entrepreneurship choices are determined by 
both formal organizational structures (i.e., incentive systems) and an informal social 
structure. This section is followed by a section describing the methodology, sample, and 
variables. The subsequent section presents the main results, and various robustness 
checks. Contributions and implications are discussed in the concluding section. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Formal Organization and Entrepreneurship Choices     
I begin by suggesting that organizational context exerts a significant influence on 
whether organizational members transition to internal or external entrepreneurship. The 
notion that organizations exercise a great deal of control over actions and behaviors of 
their members carries through much of the classic work in organization theory and 
sociology. Weber (1924), for instance, paints a vivid imagery of an iron cage – a 
bureaucratic and rationalized organization that serves as a powerful tool to control the 
actions of the humanity. Similarly, other theories of organizations emphasize the benefits 
of formally prescribed decision hierarchies in orchestrating the actions and behaviors of 
their members (e.g., Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1975). Although multiple dimensions 
of organizational structures may be relevant to evaluating the firm’s impact on and 
control over the locus of entrepreneurial activity, I focus on formal incentive systems that 
constitute a part of broader formal structures of the organization, and examine how such 






vast body of research focuses on understanding the individuals’ motives and incentives 
behind entrepreneurial entry, a consideration of these incentives should also be important 
when probing the determinants of an individual’s selection into different forms of 
entrepreneurship.  
Standard theoretical approaches consider two motives as most pertinent to 
explaining an individual’s decision to enter entrepreneurship. First, classical economic 
theories posit that the pursuit of profit represents the fundamental driver behind 
entrepreneurial entry (Kirzner 1973; Schumpeter 1942; Scitovszky 1943). Second, as 
suggested by more recent accounts, entrepreneurs are motivated by the desire to gain 
autonomy and decision-making control (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Blanchflower, 
Oswald and Stutzer, 2001; Hamilton, 2000). Applied to the context of entrepreneurship 
choices, these theoretical accounts suggest that, by adjusting internal incentives 
organizations will be able to influence the locus of entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, 
by providing the would-be entrepreneurs with higher levels of compensation and greater 
amounts of decision-making control internally, the parent firm should induce the 
formation of an internal venture and decrease the probability of a new venture to be 
formed externally.  
An alternative view would suggest that highly compensated members of the 
organization are more likely to pursue external opportunities to found new ventures. 
Consistently, the existing research has documented that a relief from financial constraints 






1989). Stuart and Sorenson (2003) find, for instance, that liquidity events increase the 
risk of entrepreneurial entry by potentially attenuating the financial constraints of high-
potential entrepreneurs. However, one may also expect that an increase in the level of 
compensation inside the organization will strengthen an entrepreneur’s ex-ante incentives 
to deploy efforts internally, if everything else, including the potential outside profits, is 
equal. Consistent with this argument, economic literature emphasizes the beneficial 
impact of compensation on managerial motivation to work towards corporate goals, as 
the principal’s and the agent’s interests become effectively aligned (e.g., Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990).  
Similarly, entrepreneurial actors may have stronger incentives to create new 
ventures internally rather than externally, when provided with greater amount of 
discretion by the parent organization. In this respect, the property rights theory 
illuminates the importance of an actor’s control over inputs in sustaining her engagement 
and motivation in the transaction with another party (Hart and Moore, 1990). Therefore, 
as nascent entrepreneurs become endowed with a greater amount of discretion inside the 
organization, they should have stronger ex-ante incentives to pursue entrepreneurial 
opportunities inside.   
In sum, formal organizational structures (i.e., incentives) may play an important 
role in influencing an entrepreneur’s decision regarding the locus of a new venture. By 
providing their members with higher compensation and discretion – the fundamental 






the rates of internally developed ventures and to decrease the probability that 
entrepreneurial individuals seek for opportunities for new venture formation outside. 
Hence, when compared to their external counterparts, intrapreneurs should be provided 
with higher compensation and greater discretion inside the organization. More formally, 
Hypothesis 1: Conditional on developing a new venture, higher compensation of 
an organizational member will increase the likelihood of internal rather than 
external venture founding.  
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on developing a new venture, greater discretion of an 
organizational member will increase the likelihood of internal rather than external 
venture founding. 
Beyond Formal Organization: Informal Social Structure      
Consistent with the theoretical perspectives that consider organizations as 
powerful systems of control, one might expect formal organizational structures, such as 
incentives systems, to exert much influence on an individual’s selection to different 
forms of entrepreneurship. But entrepreneurship is also a social process and 
entrepreneurial actors often respond to a rich set of cues from their social environment. 
For instance, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that entry to entrepreneurship is 
importantly affected by the composition of an individual’s peer group (e.g., Nanda and 
Sørensen, 2008), family endorsement (Sørensen, 2007b), or prior conduct of close 
associates (e.g., Stuart and Ding, 2006). The quintessentially social nature of 
entrepreneurship is further evident in a vast number of theoretical and empirical studies 
that relate the entrepreneur’s ability to create new ventures to her position in a social 
structure; more specifically, the central role of networks at every stage of entrepreneurial 






established (see Stuart and Sorenson, 2007; Thornton, 1999 for review). Therefore, to the 
extent that incentives of nascent entrepreneurs are embedded in an informal social 
structure (e.g., Granovetter, 1974; 1985), one might expect that the consideration of 
formal structures of the organization offers a limited account of the determinants of 
internal and external venture formation. Hence, a comprehensive theoretical account of 
entrepreneurship choices must incorporate an understanding of how these choices are 
shaped by the variation in the characteristics of nascent entrepreneur’s informal social 
ties. Hence, informal social structures in which entrepreneurial actors are embedded may 
represent an important challenge to the formal organization in the context of 
entrepreneurship choices.  
If an informal social structure is consequential for the decision regarding the locus 
of a new venture, the question arises, what is a theoretically relevant and empirically 
observable manifestation of such a structure? Naturally, entrepreneurs’ motives and 
abilities may be influenced by different kinds of social ties, ranging from ―strong‖ 
friendship networks that provide socio-emotional resources (e.g., Brüderl and 
Preisendörfer, 1998) to ―weak‖ or ―bridging‖ ties that transfer information across market 
participants (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; 1974). Because weak ties facilitate 
recruitment into the organization (e.g., Fernandez, Castilla and Moore, 2000; Fernandez 
and Weinberg, 1997; Granovetter, 1995) and provide mobility-related advantages (De 
Graaf and Flap, 1988; Granovetter, 1974), they may play an equally important role on 






While many examples of directly observed interpersonal ties could be cited, 
network theorists suggest that actors’ participation in a common setting provides a 
sufficient base for the formation of a social tie (e.g., McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1982). 
In a knowledge-based economy associated with a high level of skill and human capital, 
academic institutions represent a context in which actors typically interact early in their 
careers, as universities play an increasingly important role in equipping managers with 
skills and repertoires for managing (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Hence, I choose to 
focus on ―school networks,‖ – or affiliation ties developed through the actors’ 
participation in the academic context. Albeit not extensive, there is some evidence that 
school networks play an important role in financial markets. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy 
(2007; 2008), for instance, find that analysts outperform on their stock recommendations 
when they are tied to the company through school networks, and that portfolio managers 
place larger bets and perform significantly better on firms they are connected to through 
their school network. In addition, whereas the majority of existing studies relate the 
creation of new internal ventures and internal innovation to intra-organizational networks 
(e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1996), the impact of external ties on internal venture formation 
has been less well explored. Finally, while the majority of network studies in the 
entrepreneurial context notoriously suffer from endogeneity, school ties are less 
susceptible to this concern, given that they are formed prior to an individual’s entry into 
the labor market. By focusing on exogenous school ties, I mitigate the concern of 






may proxy for the characteristics of an individual’s parent organization.    
 An overview of the fund managers’ educational backgrounds further suggests that 
school ties may be salient in the mutual fund industry. Consider, for example, that 28% of 
all fund managers hold an Ivy League diploma, even though there only are eight Ivy 
League institutions altogether.
 
Although, in the United States, there are over 4,000 
accredited academic universities, 40% of fund managers attended an ―elite school‖ – 
which, in addition to Ivy Leagues, includes a number of other prestigious universities, 
such as Stanford, Northwestern, University of Michigan, University of California- 
Berkeley, University of California-Los Angeles, New York University, and the 
University of Chicago (Useem and Karabel, 1986). Because a disproportionate number of 
fund managers obtained their training at a relatively small number of similar academic 
institutions, one may expect these managers to be mutually acquainted or to have come 
into direct contact, during or after university education. While anecdotal evidence has 
long suggested the importance of school ties for individual and organizational outcomes, 
their role has remained relatively underexplored, with an exception of a handful of 
studies documenting the influence of school networks on labor markets (e.g., Saloner, 
1985; Simon and Warner, 1992), or on strategic alliance formation (Siegel, 2007). To 
date, few studies, however, have examined whether and how school ties affect 
entrepreneurial choices and the creation of new organizations more broadly.  
 Although multiple mechanisms may be operative, I suggest that school networks 






social influence exerted across network members. There is a vast literature documenting 
the role of social proximity in triggering processes that mold the attitudes and behaviors 
of social actors (e.g., Burt, 1987; Coleman, 1964, Katz and Lazersfeld, 1955; Marsden 
and Laumann, 1984). Because common educational background represents an important 
dimension of sociodemographic proximity, attendance of the same academic institution 
should provide a sufficient condition for the ego to view network alters as socially 
comparable, and to use their behaviors as a frame of reference for subjective judgments. 
Socio-psychological mechanisms are particularly relevant to illuminating the impact of 
informal school ties on the choices of the nascent entrepreneur. Specifically, based on 
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), nascent entrepreneurs may ―monitor‖ and 
compare themselves to other socially relevant members of the network. The referent 
choice frameworks further posit that individuals select similar others – often members of 
their networks – as referents (Kulik and Ambrose, 1992; Shah, 1998). Similarly, as 
predicted by the social learning theory, nascent entrepreneurs will refer to the behaviors 
of socially comparable school network alters to infer appropriate courses of action 
(Bandura, 1986), expecting similar payoffs from engaging in similar activities (Ellison 
and Fudenberg, 1993). The socio-psychological mechanisms rooted in the social 
comparison and social learning theories provide insights that are somewhat similar to 
those offered by structural and role equivalence (Burt, 1987; 1990; Sailer, 1978; Winship 
and Mandel, 1983) –whereby the members of the school network should perceive one 






relations with other network members.      
 Whereas observation-based information exchange and social comparison 
processes may offer a sufficient condition to trigger inter-actor influences that shape 
entrepreneurial choices, it may also be that at least some members of the network are 
connected through interpersonal ties that diffuse private information and advice (e.g., 
Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). However, even if person-
to-person communication underlines the effect of the school network on an individual’s 
entrepreneurship choices, the predictions would, nonetheless, be consistent with those 
formulated based on social comparison and observation-based influence. Nevertheless, 
qualitative evidence collected as a part of the study provides additional support for 
observation-driven social comparison mechanisms. As one manager noted, 
―I try to get a sense of what other folks from my university do. Did they get into a 
hedge fund business? And I think to myself, if they can succeed, I can succeed, 
too. After all, we all got the same degree, and we should get similar returns from 
it.‖ 
 
Together, these arguments suggest that nascent entrepreneurs will refer to and 
emulate the previous entrepreneurship choices made by their socially relevant peers – the 
members of their school network. Thus, as the number of network alters who previously 
created external ventures increases, nascent entrepreneurs will be more likely to create 
external rather than internal ventures. Similarly, an increase in the number of school 






manager subsequently develops a new venture inside rather than outside. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Conditional on developing a new venture, the probability of 
external venture formation increases with a larger number of school network 
members who founded external ventures. 
Hypothesis 3b: Conditional on developing a new venture, the probability of 
 internal venture formation increases with a larger number of school network 
 members who founded internal ventures. 
School Ties or Common Skills?  
Whereas theories of social influence predict that previous conduct of school 
network members should increase the probability that the ego engages in a similar 
behavior, an alternative explanation would point to the role of common education, given 
that academic institutions foster ―the development of organizational norms among 
professional managers and their staff‖ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152). To mitigate 
this concern, I conduct additional tests. To the extent that network mechanisms account 
for the similarity of entrepreneurship choices across school network alters, the school 
ties’ effect should increase with greater proximity of school network alters. On the other 
hand, if common education explains similarity of entrepreneurship choices, the proximity 
of school network alters would be irrelevant when assessing the impact of those alters on 
the ego’s decision. To further evaluate these predictions, I focus on two dimensions of 
proximity: spatial and social.  
There is much evidence to suggest that observation and interaction of social actors 
is facilitated across smaller geographic distances (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 






proximity facilitates the spread of innovation (e.g., Davis and Greve, 1997), and increases 
the likelihood of entry into a new market position (Greve, 1998). Therefore, if social 
influence transmitted through network ties underlines the similarity of entrepreneurship 
choices across same-university graduates, the effect of school ties should be stronger for 
spatially proximate network members. Relatedly, social influence and role modeling have 
been shown to increase across socially similar actors (e.g., McPherson, and Smith-Lovin, 
1986; Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). There is evidence, for example, that social similarity of 
previous adopters facilitates the spread of a new practice (e.g., Rogers, 1983). Because 
social ties are typically homophilous with respect to gender (e.g., Marsden, 1988; 
McPherson, and Smith-Lovin, 1986), I expect the effect of school ties on 
entrepreneurship choices to be stronger within same-gender school ties. For example, if 
social influence transmitted through network ties accounts for the similarity of 
entrepreneurial choices across same-school graduates, we should expect a female 
graduate of Michigan to be influenced by the prior conduct of other females who 
graduated from Michigan more than by a similar conduct of male graduates of Michigan. 
More formally,  
Hypothesis 4: The influence of school ties on the ego’s choice between internal 
and external venture formation will increase with greater spatial proximity of 
school network alters. 
Hypothesis 5: The influence of school ties on the ego’s choice between internal 
 and external venture formation will be stronger within same-gender ties.  







I use a sample of all mutual funds from the CRSP US Mutual Fund. The data 
available via CRSP are survivor-bias free, as they include information on both live and 
defunct funds. This study uses data collected for the period between 1979 and 2006, since 
the mutual fund industry grew rapidly over that period. The entire data amount to 8,313 
unique funds and 8,014 unique fund managers – for the total of 569,946 month-manger 
observations. For the purpose of my study, the population of interest includes solely 
entrepreneurial portfolio managers – those who created new ventures either internally or 
externally.
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 I further use the TASS Database on hedge funds to crosscheck the names of 
portfolio managers and identify fund managers who left to start hedge fund families. The 
TASS Database tracks information on live and defunct hedge funds, and is free of 
survivorship bias. It provides the names of managers in charge of a given fund, as well as 
a set of financial characteristics, including monthly net asset value, fund inception date, 
and investment objectives. Managers whose name appears in both databases are 
identified as those who depart from the mutual fund industry to start up a hedge fund 
company. I merge the CRSP and TASS data sets by the unique names of portfolio 
managers, including the first and the last name, and the middle initial. To further ensure 
identification, I check if the data on manager’s appearance in the TASS database 
coincides with the date they last appear in the CRSP data base, and the date that a new 
hedge fund company is created. I supplement quantitative analyses with the semi-
structured and informal but relevant interviews on a convenience sample of twenty-five 
                                                        






fund managers. The interviewees were asked about the processes of internal and external 
fund formation, as well as the role of the school ties in shaping entrepreneurial choices of 
fund managers. These interviews provide support to my argument that fund managers, 
indeed, face the choices described above, and that their informal ties to school colleagues 
play an important role in affecting those choices. 
Fund Manager Data 
I collect data on managerial characteristics and career histories from several 
different sources. Part of the data is obtained from the Morningstar Mutual Funds OnDisc 
database that provides a list of managers, including names of all current and past 
managers, the dates when their tenures began and ended, and some biographic data, 
including academic institutions attended and managers’ dates of graduation. A possible 
problem with the Morningstar database is that it reports data starting 1990 and provides 
biographic data for less than half of the universe of mutual fund managers, raising a 
potential concern of sample selection bias. Therefore, I update missing values using 
hand-collected data. First, I supplement the list of fund managers with data obtained via 
CRSP. I further consult the Nelson directories on U.S. mutual funds that report extensive 
data on managers, mutual funds, and fund families. Additionally, I use multiple Internet 
sources, including publicly available SEC filings, mutual fund websites, and on-line 
career search engines (i.e., Zabasearch, LinkedIn, and ZoomInfo). Combining this set of 
different resources, I am able to obtain an extensive list of portfolio managers, dates of 






and graduate institutions attended, and the year when the manager obtained a degree at 
each of the institutions attended. 
Dependent Variables 
External vs. Internal Choice. For each portfolio manager that forms a new 
venture, I create a variable equal to 1 if a new venture is created externally, and 0 if a 
new venture is created internally. External venture creation is defined as a departure of 
the fund manager to set up an external fund family that did not exist before the focal 
manager’s departure. By contrast, internal fund creation involves opening a new fund 
inside the parent fund family. To mitigate the concern that the manager could be hired to 
supervise an internally created fund, I focus solely on those managers who have been 
employed by the family prior to the creation of the new fund within that family. This 
variable is observed monthly.  
Explanatory Variables 
Formal Organizational Structures: Incentive Systems 
Discretion. I measure manager’s discretion by accounting for the amount of 
decision-making control she has over the funds supervised. Funds managed by multiple 
managers have diffused decision-making processes and provide any single manager with 
less control over important decisions, such as the selection of stocks to buy or to sell. For 
each manager, the variable is equal 1 divided by the number of co- managers supervising 
the focal fund. Therefore, the variable takes values from 0 to 1, where higher values 








 For robustness, I use a binary variable coded 0 if the focal manager 
has no co-managers and 1 otherwise. The results are qualitatively similar (unreported).  
Compensation. Although data on exact managerial compensation in the mutual 
fund industry is simply nonexistent, the finance literature commonly uses a proxy that 
represents the product of assets under manager’s supervision and the expense ratio, where 
the expense ratio indicates the total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s 
operating expenses, including management fees or the compensation received by the 
manager. The assumption here is that manager’s compensation increases with higher 
expense ratio and the size of the fund.    
Informal Social Structure: School Ties 
For each set of regressions, I create different independent variables that aim to test 
the effect of school ties on entrepreneurship decisions. Based on the network literature 
suggesting that social networks are often formed via group affiliation and membership 
rather than direct interactions (e.g., McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1982), I consider any 
two managers as belonging to the same network if they graduated from the same 
academic institution. Therefore, I identify a school network by grouping fund managers 
who attended the same university and obtained at least one of the following degrees: 
BBA, BA, BSc, MBA, MA, JD, or PhD. Managers who graduated from more than one 
academic institution are members of more than one network. For example, a graduate of 
Stanford and Michigan is considered to be a member of both the Stanford and the 
                                                        







Michigan networks. For robustness, I weigh the networks by cohort (managers who 
overlapped in their years of education); as indicated by the results (unreported), the effect 
is stronger within overlapping cohorts.   
Network members’ entrepreneurship choices. To test the hypothesized influence 
of past choices of school network members on the entrepreneurial choice of the focal 
manager, I create two measures – one for internal and the other for external ventures. 
First, I count the number of school network members who created external funds over the 
period of 12 months. I subsequently construct an internal venture measure by counting 
the number of school network members who created internal ventures over the period of 
12 months. I further conduct a sensitivity analysis and lag the variable by one year and 
six months, for robustness. Both network variables are observed monthly.  
Spatial Proximity. I measure spatial proximity based on the zip code in which a 
fund family is headquartered. I use the CRSP database to obtain a zip code corresponding 
to each fund family’s headquarters. For externally created funds, I aggregate the number 
of school network members who developed external ventures in the past year, and who 
operate in the same zip code as the focal manager. I further construct a similar measure 
for internally created funds. For robustness, I use a fax area code (since most phone 
numbers listed in the database begin with ―1-800‖) as well as the city name, and obtain 
similar results. The two variables are observed monthly. 
Same-gender ties. To test whether the effect of school ties is amplified for same-






gender is the same as that of the focal manager. I further construct a similar measure for 
internally developed ventures.  
Control Variables  
I first control for various manager-specific characteristics that may influence the 
choice between internal and external venture formation. To that end, I account for 
manager’s demographics, such as gender and age. Gender is inferred from the managers’ 
first name and coded as 1 if male and 0 if female. I use various Internet search engines, 
such as the Zoominfo database and the on-line SEC filings to identify the masculine 
(―Mr.)‖ or the feminine (―Ms.‖) prefix for names with no clear corresponding gender. To 
account for age, I hand-collect data on the fund manager’s dates of birth using various 
Internet search engines (e.g., LinkedIn, Zoominfo), and the existing databases (e.g., 
Morningstar and Nelson Directory of Investment Managers). 
I further include various measures of human capital because the decision 
regarding the new venture locus may be influenced by managerial skills and talent. Past 
research has suggested that the risk of entrepreneurial transition increases with an 
individual’s career experience, as individuals acquire resources and skills conducive to 
founding a new business (e.g., Higgins, 2005; Romanelli, 1989; Sorenson and Audia, 
2000). Consequently, I control for the manager’s industry tenure by counting the number 
of months the manager appears in the database. For robustness, I include a measure of 






In addition, I account for manager’s performance. Prior research has documented 
that high performing knowledge workers found new organizations to derive returns on 
their human capital (Groysberg, Nanda, and Prats, 2007). I therefore expect that, 
compared to their counterparts, higher performing fund managers will tend to leave in 
pursuit of external ventures, as opposed to creating new funds inside. I measure 
manager’s performance using monthly total fund returns available via CRSP – a standard 
performance measure used in the finance literature.  
Moreover, I include a variable to account for size of the fund supervised by the 
focal manager. For managers who supervise more than one fund, an averaged fund size is 
calculated. Because fund’s size indicates manager’s ability to attract investment, I expect 
that portfolio managers who supervise bigger funds are better performers more likely to 
leave to create new organizations, as opposed to developing new ventures internally.    
Furthermore, I control for the focal manager’s human capital by including a 
measure of her formal education. Because nascent entrepreneurs with deeper educational 
backgrounds should have greater human capital, they may be more likely to create 
independent ventures, as opposed to deploying their entrepreneurial efforts inside the 
parent organization. Educational attainment is coded 1 if the focal manager received a 
bachelor’s degree (BBA, or BA/BS), 2 if the manager eared MBA, MA/MS, or JD, and 3 
if the manager obtained a PhD degree. In addition, I control formally for elite school 
education. Because elite schools graduates have been documented to more likely advance 






systematically exposed to differential opportunities regarding new venture creation. To 
measure elite school education, I create a binary variable equal 1 if the focal manager 
attended an Ivy League or received a degree from a non-Ivy League but an elite 
institution.
16
 For robustness, I create a measure of Ivy League institutions only, and 
obtain similar results (unreported). 
Finally, for each manager, I control for the focal manager’s network size. A larger 
school network may broaden the entrepreneur’s opportunity structure and thus affect the 
choice between internal and external fund formation. To that end, I aggregate the number 
of managers who graduated from the same school as the focal fund manager. This 
variable is observed monthly.   
Another group of control variables takes into account firm-specific context that 
may affect entrepreneurship choices. Specifically, I account for organizational age, size 
and performance. Prior literature has shown that older and bigger organizations provide 
exposure to fewer entrepreneurial opportunities and that they equip organizational 
members with limited skills to create independent ventures (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; 
Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005; Sørensen 2007a). Consequently, I expect that 
individuals socialized in older and larger organizations will be less likely to develop 
external ventures. By contrast, larger and older organizations may offer more 
opportunities for internal venture formation (Schumpeter, 1950). To measure firm size, I 
use total assets under management, which represents a commonly used measure of fund 
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family’s size. For robustness, I include a count of all managers employed by the fund 
family. To measure firm age, I use the CRSP database to derive the age of the oldest fund 
in the family.  
 I further account for fund family performance. On the one hand, better 
performing organizations may equip their entrepreneurs with resources that facilitate the 
formation of independent ventures. For instance, Burton, Sørensen and Beckman (2002) 
find that entrepreneurs benefit from reputational and informational resources provided by 
their prior employers. On the other hand, highly performing organizations may be able to 
allocate more resources towards internal venture formation and provide their members 
with opportunities for internal venture formation. Firm performance is calculated as the 
average fund return for the focal fund family using a value weighted approach. The value 
weighted approach captures the total return by multiplying each family’s return by its 
relative size in the family, and by taking the sum across all weighted fund returns inside 
the firm.  
Finally, I control for market uncertainty. Because creating a new venture is 
associated with higher risk and uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Venkataraman, 1997), the 
probability of external entrepreneurship should decrease with unfavorable market 
conditions. Compared to external, internal ventures are associated with lower degree of 
risk, as the company is likely to cushion potential risk of failure by reallocating the failed 
entrepreneur to another task (Scharfstein and Gromb, 2002). Hence, under greater market 






than external funds. I create the measure of market uncertainty using a financial formula 
to calculate market volatility for period t (Campbell et al., 2001).
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Model Specification            
 I estimate the effect of the formal incentive systems and school networks on the 
choice between internal and external venture formation by using logistic regression 
models and cluster standard errors by manager. Compared to alternative specifications, 
logit model allows for a direct comparison between internal and external entrepreneurs. It 
further helps mitigate important concerns related to the unobserved firm, and school 
characteristics, as well as economy-wide effects, via firm-fixed effects, school-fixed 









where Oijt is equal to 1 if the new venture is developed outside the fund family, and 0 if it 
is developed inside, 
 j
are school-fixed effects, 
 i
are firm-fixed effects, 
 t
are time-
fixed effects, X is the vector of the explanatory variables, and F(.) is the logistic function. 
For robustness, I use two alternative model specifications: the Cox proportional hazard 
model (Cox, 1972) of competing risks – that allows for multiple outcomes and measures 
the time duration until one of the types of a new venture (internal or external) is formed – 
                                                        
17 I use the following formula to calculate market volatility:  MKTt= σ²mt ∑ (Rms- µm) ² where µm is defined 












Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The total sample 
consists of 8,014 managers, of which more than a half (56%) create a new venture either 
internally or externally. This suggests that out of 8,014 portfolio managers, 3501 never 
engage in an entrepreneurial effort. Of those who self-select to entrepreneurship, 84% 
percent (3,794) create internal ventures, whereas 16% (719) choose to develop new funds 
outside. In the present study, I randomly sample entrepreneurial portfolio managers to 
hand-collect data on their demographics, including educational background. The final 
sample used in the study consists of 1,744 internally and 427 externally created ventures 
for the total number of 2,171 of entrepreneurial fund managers.  
                                                  ------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4.1 about here 
                                                 ------------------------------------------- 
Formal Organizational Structure, Informal Social Structure and Fund Managers’ 
Entrepreneurship Choices: Multivariate Analysis 
 
                                                        
18 While useful, the Cox proportional hazard model is somewhat limited, as compared to the conditional 
logit; unlike the conditional logit, an event-history framework does not allow for firm-fixed effects 
estimator when subjects in the firm experience no more than one event. In the present setting, however, 
portfolio managers typically create an external venture only once. In the Cox analysis, I present robust 







Table 4.2 presents the results estimated using firm-fixed effects regression models 
to test the hypothesized effect of formal (i.e., incentives) and informal (school ties) 
structures on entrepreneurial choices. The results provide support for the hypothesized 
relation between discretion and entrepreneurship choices, consistent with property rights 
theory, which suggests that greater discretion strengthens individual’s ex-ante incentives. 
A negative coefficient on the variable measuring discretion indicates that, relative to their 
counterparts, entrepreneurial fund managers endowed with greater discretion are more 
likely to develop new ventures inside than outside. Similarly, a negative coefficient on 
compensation indicates that an increase in the pay of fund managers will make it more 
likely for them to invest their efforts in creating new ventures inside than outside the 
parent organization.  
The results are significant in magnitude. One standard deviation increase in the 
level of discretion will decrease the odds of the focal manager founding a new fund 
externally rather than internally by 17% (exp(-0.621*0.305)-1). Finally, one standard 
deviation increase in the level of managerial compensation will decrease the odds of the 
focal manager founding a new fund externally rather than internally by 31% (exp(-
0.007*52)-1). Overall, the results reported in model 1 show that, by providing their 
entrepreneurial members with greater compensation and discretion, organizations are able 
to induce internal fund creation, and thus decrease the probability of entrepreneurial 






Models (2)-(3) further report the results regarding the influence of school ties on 
the fund manager’s entrepreneurial choice. Model (2) provides support for Hypothesis 3a 
indicating that entrepreneurial managers will set up external funds when a greater number 
of their school network members developed new funds outside in the previous period. 
Similarly, Model (3) demonstrates the effect of internal ventures developed by school 
network members on the focal manager’s future choices. As predicted (Hypothesis 3b), 
the probability of internal fund formation increases with the number of school colleagues 
who previously created new funds internally. Model (4) shows the estimates for the two 
network variables (internal and external funds created by school network alters) together, 
while Model (5) adds an additional control – the size of the school network. The results 
reported in Model (5) demonstrate that the impact of school ties on entrepreneurship 
choices is independent of the network size.  
It further merits note that the results are substantial in magnitude. The coefficients 
in Model (5) suggest that if one more member in the focal manager’s school network 
created an external fund in the previous period, the odds of the focal manager founding 
an external rather than internal fund will increase by 90% (exp(0.647*1)-1). 
Alternatively, if one more member in the focal manager’s school network created an 
internal fund in the previous period, the odds of the focal manager founding an external 
rather than internal fund will decrease by 22% (exp(-0.253*1)-1).  
Additional results presented in Table 4.2 further report the impact of individual, 






choices. With respect to manager-specific characteristics, the results indicate that men are 
more likely than women to create external funds (Model 1 and Model 3). Moreover, 
Models (1) - (5) show that the probability of external, as opposed to internal, fund 
creation decreases with manager’s age, suggesting that old managers may prefer to 
pursue the development of less risky ventures inside the parent firm. Consistent with the 
literature indicating that talented individuals are more likely to leave to set up their own 
businesses (Groysberg, Nanda, and Prats, 2007), I find that the probability of external 
fund formation increases with manager’s performance, as evidenced by Models (1) - (5). 
Contrary to the expected relation, the probability that a fund manager starts up an 
external fund decreases with her industry tenure (Models 2, 4 and 5). I further find that, 
compared to their counterparts creating new ventures internally, managers creating 
external ventures are more likely to have received elite school education (Models 1, 3, 4 
and 5). However, the measure of the highest degree earned does not systematically 
predict the fund manager’s choice between external and internal fund formation.   
With respect to firm-specific characteristics, the results consistently indicate 
(Models 1-5) that larger organizations experience higher rates of inside than outside 
ventures, even though the coefficients have a low economic significance. Similarly, the 
coefficient on the number of fund managers inside the fund family provides some support 
that the individual’s propensity for external, as compared to internal, venture formation 
decreases with organization’s size (Models 1-3). Additionally, the findings indicate that 






performance (Models 1-5), while the prediction that older organizations will have a 
stronger influence on entrepreneurial choices finds no empirical support.  
Together, these findings have important implications for the literature examining 
the impact of bureaucracies on entrepreneurial rates. Whereas most extant research 
documents that bureaucratic organizations reduce entrepreneurial rates by providing 
limited exposure to entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g., Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; 
Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005; Sørensen , 2007a), an alternative explanation 
(supported in the present study) may be that large bureaucratic organizations ―spawn‖ 
fewer external ventures because they are able to foster entrepreneurial activity inside.   
Finally, consistent with the hypothesized relation between market uncertainty and 
entrepreneurship choices, the estimates show that the probability of internal vs. external 
fund formation increases as markets become more uncertain (Models 1-5). This finding 
validates the claim that entrepreneurs may perceive external venture formation as more 
risky and they may be, therefore, compelled to create external funds under lower market 
uncertainty.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4.2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Whereas Table 4.2 presents the main model of the study, I perform several 
robustness checks. First, in additional analyses, I expand the main model to account for 






and social structure covariates. The results, estimated in the expanded model and reported 
in Table A2 (see the Appendix), are consistent with the findings reported separately in 
the first and the second study.
19
 Second, the main population ―at risk‖ is limited to 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, for robustness I additionally include non-entrepreneurial fund 
managers in the population at risk. I use the Cox proportional hazard model to examine 
the competing risks, as well as the multinomial logit model to test the hypothesized 
relations. The main results reported in Table A3 (see the Appendix) are robust to those 
alternative model specifications.          
 Table 4.3 further presents the results estimated using firm-fixed effects to test the 
moderating impact of geographic propinquity. The results presented in Table 4.3 provide 
support for Hypothesis 4, demonstrating that the school network effect is amplified with 
geographic propinquity of school network members. As illustrated by Model (1), the 
coefficient on the count of spatially close school network alters who created external 
funds is positive and significant, controlling for the total number of school alters who 
created new funds externally. Similarly, as evidenced in Model (2), the coefficient on the 
number of spatially proximate network alters who created new funds internally is 
negative and significant, even when controlling for the total number of network members 
who founded new funds inside. Model 3 illustrates the results when both measures of 
spatial propinquity are included. Together, these results indicate that the effect of school 
                                                        
19 Because the expanded model includes time-invariant imprinting variables, the use of firm-fixed effects is 






ties is, indeed, amplified by spatial propinquity of the network members – and is, 
therefore, less likely to be explained by the influence of common education.   
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4.3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Similarly, Table 4.4 presents regression results estimated using firm-fixed effects 
to test the prediction that the school network effect should be stronger within same-
gender ties. As illustrated in Table 4.4, this hypothesis finds empirical support. The 
results provide support for Hypothesis 5, showing that the school network effect is 
amplified within same-gender school ties. Model (1) shows that the coefficient on the 
count of same-gender network alters who created external funds is positive and 
significant, controlling for the total number of school alters who created new funds 
externally. Consistently, Model (2) shows that the coefficient on the number of same-sex 
network alters who created new funds internally is negative and significant, when 
controlling for the total number of network members who founded new funds inside. 
Model 3 reports the results for both measures included. Overall, these results indicate that 
the focal fund manager is more likely to imitate the prior conduct of her school network 
members, when those members are of the same gender as the focal manager herself. The 
findings provide further support to the claim that the effect of school ties is due to 







Insert Table 4.4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Robustness Tests - Alternative Explanations 
Although the present study suggests that the locus of a new venture is shaped by 
the social influence of school network members, it may be that school ties simply proxy 
for other sources of social influence. First, based on the literature that documents the 
influence of co-workers on entrepreneurial transition (e.g., Nanda and Sørensen, 2008; 
Stuart and Ding 2006), we may expect that the effect of school network members proxies 
for the influence of co-workers. Second, extant research has demonstrated that the launch 
of new ventures in geographic proximity stimulates prospective entrepreneurs to follow, 
as they interpret the interest of others in the market as a signal of the market’s 
munificence (e.g., Bikchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch, 1992; Sørensen and Sorenson, 
2003). Hence, the observed impact of school network members may simply proxy for the 
regional rates of internally or externally created ventures. To account for those two 
additional sources of influence, I control for previous entrepreneurship choices of the 
focal manager’s co-workers (i.e., managers employed by the same fund family), as well 
as for regional rates of internally and externally created funds.
20
 The results in Table A4 
(see the Appendix) indicate that school ties affect the manager’s choice between internal 
                                                        
20 New ventures are considered as being created in the same region when they are founded by managed 
employed by firms headquartered in the same zip code. For robustness, I use alternative definitions of 






and external venture formation even after controlling for the previous choices of co-
workers, and for the regional founding rates.   
Moreover, it may be that the observed effect of school ties on the fund manager’s 
entrepreneurship choices is driven by the number of ties inside and outside the parent 
organization. Because networks facilitate the identification of opportunities and 
mobilization of resources (e.g., Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Burt 1992; Freeman, 1986), a 
larger external school network may broaden the manager’s opportunity set and yield 
greater social capital benefits (Burt, 1992, 1997; Lin, 1999), thereby increasing the 
likelihood of external rather than internal fund formation. Similarly, if informal networks 
help mobilize resources and reduce uncertainty inside the organization, managers may be 
more inclined to create internal rather than external ventures when tied to a larger number 
of alters inside the organization. In both cases, we might expect that the sheer number of 
school ties inside and outside the organization will account for the observed similarity of 
entrepreneurship choices across the network alters. In additional analyses, I therefore 
control for the number of the focal manager’s school ties both outside and inside the 
parent organization. The results in Table A5 (see the Appendix) show that the primary 
effect of the school network is separate from the effect of network size inside and outside 
the organization. The results further illustrate that the size of external network is 
positively related to the likelihood of external rather than internal fund creation. 






To understand the conditions under which new ventures are created inside 
established organizations and when they are founded externally, this study focuses on a 
role of an individual in determining the locus of the new venture. Specifically, it proposes 
that nascent entrepreneurs often face the choice between creating a new venture inside 
and leaving in pursuit of a new venture outside. Although their decision regarding the 
type of entrepreneurial activity pursued is partially influenced by the nature of the 
organizational context through the formal incentive systems in place, the choice is also 
informed by the entrepreneur’s informal social ties. I find that informal social ties to 
school colleagues impact entrepreneurial career trajectories by transferring information 
and serving as a referent group to nascent entrepreneurs. The school network effect is 
further amplified for geographically proximate same-gender ties, indicating that the 
impact of school networks is not driven primarily by common education – but, instead, it 
arises due to inter-actor influences transmitted through an informal social structure. 
The study’s findings further have important implications for the long-lasting 
debate about the locus of entrepreneurial and innovative activity. On one hand, starting 
with Schumpeter, scholars have argued that large established organizations represent the 
driving force behind technical progress, generating a permanent gale of creative 
destruction (Schumpeter, 1950). In this sense, the market structure consisting of large 
firms with a considerable degree of market power is ―the price that society must pay for 
rapid technological advance‖ (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 114). On the other hand, small 






radical innovation (Henderson, 1993; Tripsas, 1997). This line of research relates the 
inability of established firms to produce innovative output to corporate failure to either 
identify or assimilate emerging opportunities (Henderson, 1993; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). The present study contributes to the debate by emphasizing the role of socio-
structural mechanisms that underline the locus of entrepreneurial activity, while previous 
approaches focused primarily on technological attributes of innovation and organizations. 
 An additional implication of the present study is that individual-specific informal 
social ties may represent a non-trivial challenge to the organization that strives to regulate 
and control its boundaries. Although organizations exert some influence on the choices of 
their members by providing appropriate incentives organizational impact is largely 
limited by the employees’ informal social ties that, as evidenced in the study, may 
increase the probability of entrepreneurial exodus. A natural follow-up question would 
therefore be whether established organizations are able to internalize or respond to the 
―boundary challenge‖ posed by the social ties of their employees. To this end, the 
following empirical study examines if and under what conditions organizations cede 
greater rewards and provide stronger incentives to managers with larger external ties or 
ties to other entrepreneurs. More broadly, building on the present study, the following 
study evaluates the implications of the value of the employee’s social ties to the firm. 
Although employees’ networks have been typically considered a valuable asset to the 






assumption, by demonstrating the role of informal employees’ networks to reduce the 
organization’s control over its boundaries.  
Relatedly, the current study offers other opportunities for future research. With 
the extensive and detailed data on mutual funds, many prevailing questions about 
entrepreneurial process and the emergence of new organizations could be addressed. For 
instance, directly extending the current findings, one could examine how the social 
influence transmitted through informal ties at the time of venture founding impacts new 
venture’s future performance and survival. On the one hand, funds created under the 
social influence of network alters should outperform their counterparts if informal school 
ties signal the presence of entrepreneurial opportunities difficult to identify by network 
outsiders. On the other hand, nascent entrepreneurs may imitate the previous choices of 
their school network alters even if opportunities for profit have already been depleted. 
Hence, in additional analyses, I examine this question empirically by testing the effect of 
school ties on the new fund performance and survival. Consistent with the second 
hypothesis, the results (unreported) indicate that funds created under the social influence 
of school network members are more likely to experience negative future performance 
and shorter survival times. 
A number of additional suggestions for further research relate directly to the 
limitations of the study. First, isolating the specific operative mechanisms underlying the 
observed network effect represents an empirical challenge. Although some qualitative 






processes and exert attitudinal influence on the focal manager, it remains possible that the 
observed effect arises due to direct social ties that carry information and resources.  
To further tease out the mechanisms underlying the observed similarity of 
entrepreneurship choices, I conduct additional analyses. First, if the effect arises due to 
observation and social comparison processes, we should expect this effect to be stronger 
for more visible portfolio managers. An empirical test of this hypothesis requires 
specifying the conditions under which entrepreneurial portfolio managers belonging to 
the same school network vary with respect to their visibility. I consider several such 
conditions. First, entrepreneurial portfolio managers should be more observable when 
operating in visible cities. Perhaps the most visible location for individuals working in 
financial services is New York, where a majority of financial service organizations are 
headquartered. Therefore, if observation-based emulation rather than direct information 
exchange underlines the school network effect, we should expect that entrepreneurial 
choices of managers operating in New York will have a stronger effect on the conduct of 
their school network members than the choices of non-New-York managers. For 
instance, a Michigan manager located in San Francisco should be influenced by the 
conduct of a Michigan manager operating in New York more than by a comparable 
conduct of another Michigan manager operating in Dallas. To test this hypothesis, I 
create a measure that counts the number of managers who fulfill the following 
conditions: (1) they belong to the focal manager’s school network, (2) they have created 






families headquartered in New York. The results (unreported) indicate that the network 
effect is, indeed, amplified for entrepreneurial managers operating in New York; I find 
that portfolio managers are more likely to follow the choices of their school network 
members, when those members operate in New York. Hence, these results provide some 
support for the hypothesis suggesting that observation-based emulation, as opposed to a 
direct interpersonal exchange of information, underlines the influence of the school 
network on entrepreneurship choices.  
In further analyses, I examine one additional condition under which portfolio 
managers should be more visible to their network alters – the size of the fund under 
manager’s supervision. Because the size of the fund typically indicates managerial ability 
to attract investors, managers supervising funds with larger assets are more likely to be 
recognized for their talent and be therefore more salient. Hence, if social influence and 
social comparison underlines the impact of school ties on entrepreneurship choices, the 
effect should be stronger for entrepreneurial portfolio managers supervising bigger funds. 
An empirical test of this interaction term (unreported) provides support for the 
hypothesis, indicating the network effect to be amplified for managers supervising a 
larger portion of financial assets.  
Finally, an additional question arises as to a possible influence of adaptive 
learning on the network effect. Specifically, based on the theories of adaptive learning, 
(e.g., Levitt and March, 1988; March and Olsen, 1975) one could expect nascent 






further imply the school network effect to be mitigated for those members who failed or 
underperformed when founding new ventures. In additional analyses (unreported), I 
check for this possibility by including an interaction term. The results, however, are not 
significant indicating that nascent entrepreneurs are less likely to take into consideration 
or learn from the successes and failures of their school network members. One possibility 
may be that entrepreneurship choices made by the school network members are more 
salient to nascent entrepreneurs than the new ventures’ subsequent successes or failures. 
An alternative explanation may be that, while school network members share experience 
and information regarding new venture founding, information regarding failures is less 
likely to be transmitted through the network of school colleagues.  
Using the context of the mutual fund industry, this study takes a structural 
perspective to investigate the conditions under which entrepreneurial actors create 
internal ventures and when, by contrast, they leave in pursuit of entrepreneurial 
opportunities outside established organizations. I provide evidence that informal social 
ties to school network alters influence entrepreneurship choices by serving as the 
conduits of social influence. Together, findings presented in this chapter enrich our 
understanding of how social actors - whose interests and incentives are deeply embedded 






Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics        
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
External vs. Internal Choice (1if external, 0 if internal) 0.160 0.366 0 1 
School network members creating external funds 
(count) 1.631 2.207 0 14 
School network members creating internal funds 
(count) 3.807 5.304 0 20 
Manager’s Discretion (1/fund co-managers’ count) 0.654 0.305 0.04 1 
Manager’s Compensation (Assets*Expense Ratio) 18.63 52.04 0.0122 665.1 
Manager’s Gender (1 if male)  0.855 0.305 0 1 
Manager’s Age 44.6 9.9 20 86 
Manager’s Performance (Fund return) 0.007 0.0334 -0.297 0.359 
Fund Size (Total Assets) 1090.932 3876.915 .001 121527.3 
Industry Tenure (Months) 50.97 51.74 1 375 
Elite School Degree (0-1) 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Highest Degree Earned 1.7 0.521 1 3 
Firm Size (Assets) 40,782.02 114,425.4 0.036 1,097,765 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) 25.7 27.8 1 145 
Firm Performance (weighted family returns) 0.008 0.047 -0.891 1.623 
Firm Age (Oldest fund – month count) 28.67 21.47 1 81 
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School network alters creating 
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 (0.323) (0.311) (0.332) (0.333) 
Manager’s Compensation -0.005* -0.005* -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Manager’s Gender (male) 0.342 0.648** 0.307 0.300 
 (0.411) (0.395) (0.413) (0.413) 
Manager’s Age  -0.018* -0.013** -0.013** -0.011** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Manager’s Performance 7.806*** 6.097** 6.948** 6.802** 
 (2.714) (2.474) (2.751) (2.761) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure -0.004** -0.002 -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Elite School Degree 0.374 1.085*** 0.745* 0.909** 
 (0.407) (0.364) (0.429) (0.442) 
Highest Degree Earned  0.098 0.128 0.061 0.035 
 (0.188) (0.184) (0.198) (0.199) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) -0.024* -0.023* -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Firm Performance  -5.066* -4.540* -4.921* -4.608* 
 (2.739) (2.582) (2.781) (2.788) 
Firm Age 0.009 0.017 0.014 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Market volatility -20.225*** -21.004*** -20.355*** -20.224*** 
 (7.024) (6.793) (7.289) (7.297) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2171 2171 2171 2171 
Pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.21 0.32 0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses 



















 (1) (2) (3) 
School network alters creating external funds 
(count) 
0.435***  0.508*** 
 (0.097)  (0.100) 
Spatially prox. alters creating external funds 
(count) 
4.558***  4.611*** 
 (0.341)  (0.372) 
School network alters creating internal funds 
(count) 
 -0.334*** -0.380*** 
  (0.046) (0.076) 
Spatially prox. alters creating internal funds 
(count) 
 -0.003*** -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Manager’s Discretion -0.319** -0.902*** -0.338** 
 (0.522) (0.315) (0.547) 
Manager’s Compensation -0.004* -0.005* -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Manager’s Gender (male) -0.301 0.632 -0.277 
 (0.683) (0.394) (0.732) 
Manager’s Age  -0.007** -0.015** -0.001* 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.022) 
Manager’s Performance 8.524** 6.471*** 6.556 
 (4.029) (2.486) (4.282) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure -0.005* -0.003** -0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Elite School Degree 0.039 0.994*** 0.707 
 (0.642) (0.364) (0.695) 
Highest Degree Earned  0.086 0.155 0.183 
 (0.311) (0.185) (0.338) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) -0.022 -0.023* -0.026 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) 
Firm Performance  -3.374 -5.257** -3.519 
 (4.769) (2.646) (4.951) 
Firm Age 0.046** 0.015 0.063*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.024) 
Market volatility -19.828* -21.389*** -22.006* 
 (11.393) (6.827) (12.309) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2171 2171 2171 
Pseudo R-squared             0.72         0.22 0.76 
Standard errors in parentheses 

















 (1) (2) (3) 
School network alters creating external funds 
(count) 
0.214**  0.075** 
 (0.104)  (0.116) 
Same-gender alters creating external funds (count) 0.495***  0.876*** 
 (0.136)  (0.154) 
School network alters creating internal funds 
(count) 
 -0.043** -0.005** 
  (0.041) (0.025) 
Same-gender alters creating internal funds (count)  -0.334*** -0.564*** 
  (0.070) (0.068) 
Manager’s Discretion -0.762** -0.803*** -0.738** 
 (0.302) (0.292) (0.324) 
Manager’s Compensation -0.005* -0.004 -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Manager’s Gender (male) 0.004 1.259*** 0.506 
 (0.416) (0.426) (0.450) 
Manager’s Age  -0.020* -0.015* -0.017* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Manager’s Performance 7.088*** 6.300** 6.094** 
 (2.712) (2.558) (2.885) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Elite School Degree 0.063 1.031*** 0.534 
 (0.394) (0.349) (0.428) 
Highest Degree Earned  0.109 0.082 0.006 
 (0.183) (0.180) (0.201) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Employees -0.023 -0.026* -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) 
Firm Performance  -4.147* -4.006* -3.687* 
 (2.608) (2.424) (2.734) 
Firm Age 0.013 0.034*** 0.023 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
Market volatility -17.202*** -7.751* -12.820*** 
 (4.671) (4.218) (4.971) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2171 2171 2171 
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 0.17 0.34 
Standard errors in parentheses 






CHAPTER V: IF YOU LEAVE ME NOW… ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE 
TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP CHOICES
Abstract 
 In this chapter, I examine if and how entrepreneurship choices affect parent 
organizations. While a stream of research has contributed to the understanding of a range 
of outcomes pertaining to spin-offs founded via entrepreneurial departures (e.g., Brittian 
and Freeman, 1980; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Phillips, 2002), how entrepreneurial 
defections impact, in turn, established organizations has been less well understood. 
Therefore, in the present study, I ask the following question: How do entrepreneurship 
choices impact parent organizations? Whereas prior work has documented the effect of 
spin-offs on firm’s performance (Phillips, 2001), knowledge losses (Agarwal, 
Echambadi, Franco, and Sarkar, 2004), and knowledge gains (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 
2008), I examine whether and how entrepreneurial choices influence the internal 
structures of established organizations. Specifically, I study if organizations adapt their 
incentive structures in response to the risk of entrepreneurial departures. Findings suggest 
that employers affected by a greater risk of entrepreneurial defections are more likely to 
subsequently strengthen their internal incentive systems to retain potential entrepreneurs. 
I further find empirical support for the power-dependence mechanisms, underlying the 






the firm’s propensity to strengthen its internal incentive structures, following an increase 
in the threat of entrepreneurial exits. Together, these results provide a fruitful insight into 
our understanding of how established organizations – and specifically, their internal 
structures – are determined by the entrepreneurship choices of the social actors in these 
organizations.   
Introduction 
How do entrepreneurial choices affect parent organizations? To date, there has 
been an increasing interest in spinoffs - their structures, life chances (e.g., growth and 
survival), and strategic benefits that accrue to them via parent companies (e.g., Burton, 
Sørensen and Beckman 2002; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Klepper, 2001; Klepper and 
Thompson, 2006; Phillips, 2002; Sørensen, 1999). However, parent organizations 
themselves have been less well understood. Specifically, the question as to if and how 
spin-offs, defined as independent organizations founded via employees’ departures, 
influence in any way existing organizations has received relatively little attention. There 
have been only few attempts to develop a research agenda capable of examining the 
impact of entrepreneurial departures on parent organizations. For example, focusing on 
law firms in the Silicon Valley, Phillips (2002) finds that personnel departures to start 
new organizations decrease parent’s performance. Although previous studies offer 
important insights, they typically consider parent organizations as passive in response to 
entrepreneurial departures. This neglect is surprising because a long tradition in 






environment. For example, the open-systems perspective emphasizes the role of the 
external environment in framing organizational strategy, structure, and survival 
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1995). 
Based on a well-established body of work that documents an organization’s 
ability to change in response to the external conditions (e.g., Eccles, Nohria and Berkley, 
1992; Kotter, 1996), one could expect organizations to interact with the choices of 
nascent entrepreneurs. There is much evidence that the loss of entrepreneurial talent 
poses a considerable challenge to organizations. Failure to retain talented employees in 
open labor markets leads, for example, to a loss of organizational investment in human 
capital development (e.g., Cappelli, 2008). Similarly, migration of entrepreneurial talent 
lowers internal corporate innovation (e.g., Covin and Slevin, 1989; Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996; Zahra and Covin, 1993) that increases growth and strategic renewal (Guth and 
Ginsberg, 1990), and is essential to high-performing firms (e.g., Covin and Slevin, 1991; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). Finally, evidence can be marshaled to support the 
claim that entrepreneurial exits lower organizational performance (Phillips, 2002), and 
increase organizational inefficiencies. Because inefficiencies trigger further performance 
loss (Williamson and Ouchi, 1981), firms strive to adapt their ―inefficient‖ boundaries to 
achieve optimal outcomes in equilibrium and to prevent the threat of being ―selected out‖ 
(Williamson, 1985).  
Hence, in the current chapter of the dissertation, I shift the focus from nascent 






structures in response to entrepreneurial decisions to found a new venture either inside or 
outside. Specifically, I investigate whether and how organizations change their internal 
incentive structures in response to the threat of entrepreneurial departures. To explore 
these issues, I use a conceptual framework grounded in the power-dependence theory 
(Emerson, 1962).         
 By addressing the question regarding an organization’s response to 
entrepreneurial choices, the study makes several contributions to the current research. 
First, my findings enrich the current sociological perspectives on entrepreneurial 
spawning (e.g., Burton, Sørensen and Beckman 2002; Lerner, Gompers and Scharfstein, 
2005; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Phillips, 2002); in contrast to previous studies largely 
focused on the progeny, I argue that a more comprehensive understanding of 
entrepreneurial spawning should take into consideration the possibility that established 
organizations dynamically respond to the choices of nascent entrepreneurs affecting, in 
turn, future entrepreneurial rates. To that end, I provide empirical evidence to suggest that 
organizations strengthen their internal incentive structures, when faced with a greater 
threat of entrepreneurial exits. Moreover, the present study is one of the few to uncover 
the theoretical mechanisms behind the parent-progeny relation. Although the classical 
accounts highlight the role of efficiency concerns (Williamson, 1984), the present study 
theorizes and shows empirically that power-dependence underlines the relation between 
the employer and the nascent entrepreneur. Thereby, I provide yet another piece of 






suggests that social mechanisms underline the boundaries around organizations. Using 
the example of entrepreneurship choices, I demonstrate that individual-level decisions, 
determined by career histories and a social structure, exert a continuous influence on how 
organizations are structured and bounded in the knowledge-based economy.   
 This chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents a framework that 
theorizes about the potential influence of entrepreneurship choices on organizational 
response. This section is followed by a section describing the methodology, sample, and 
variables. The subsequent section presents the main results, and various robustness 
checks. Finally, I discuss the implications and contributions in the concluding section. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Organizational Boundary Management 
Do organizations respond to entrepreneurial choices? I argue that power-
dependence mechanisms underline the relation between the entrepreneurs’ decision 
regarding internal versus external venture formation and the parent organization. 
According to the power dependence perspective (Emerson, 1962; Friedkin, 1986; 
Piskorski and Casciaro, 2004; Thompson, 1967), an employee-employer dyad may be 
understood in terms of a social exchange between two mutually dependent parties; in this 
exchange, the employee depends on the firm’s resources and rewards, while the employer 
relies on entrepreneurial skills and talent. Entrepreneurship choices shift the balance of 
power in an exchange in favor of the employee. As the opportunities for entrepreneurship 






entrepreneurs. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s dependence on organizational resources 
weakens, while his or her bargaining position vis-à-vis the parent organization 
strengthens.  
From the organization’s perspective, higher risk of entrepreneurial exits reinforces 
an organization’s dependence on entrepreneurial talent; as nascent entrepreneurs are 
provided with broader outside employment opportunities, organizations face a greater 
challenge recruiting and retaining talent. Because, in an exchange, a more powerful party 
appropriates a larger portion of benefits (Emerson, 1962; Thompson, 1967), the employer 
will be more compelled to cede rewards to a potential entrepreneur, once the dependence 
shifts in favor of the employee. Therefore, I expect that an increase in the threat of 
entrepreneurial exits will strengthen the internal incentive systems, as organizations 
attempt to induce intrapreneurship. This suggests that organizations would adapt their 
internal structures in response to the threat of their employees’ departures.  
As documented in the second empirical paper, organizational members are at a 
higher risk of entrepreneurial exit, when alters of their informal network chose to pursue 
external opportunities in the past. Therefore, organizations whose employees have ties to 
entrepreneurial alters outside, should be more compelled to strengthen their incentive 
systems in the future. While I am unable to test it empirically, I assume that the threat 
may be recognized in at least two ways. It may be that the organization observes the 
turnover of its employees’ school network members and decides to cede greater rewards 






of departure may be more successful at negotiating with the organization higher benefits. 
Regardless of the specific theoretical mechanism, organizations will be more likely to 
strengthen internal incentives to counter the threat of employees’ exit for external 
ventures. 
Based on the findings presented in the two past studies, internal incentives, such 
as discretion and compensation, reduce the risk of entrepreneurial exit by fostering 
internal venture formation. Hence, I expect that employees likely to transition to 
entrepreneurship should receive greater compensatory and discretionary rewards from 
their parent organizations. This logic implies that organizations, whose employees are 
tied to entrepreneurial network alters, will provide nascent entrepreneurs with greater 
discretion and compensation. More formally:  
Hypothesis 1a: Higher rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ 
school network alters will lead to higher compensation provided by the 
organization to its employees.   
Hypothesis 1b: Higher rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ 
school network alters will lead to higher discretion provided by the organization 
to its employees.    
If power dependence accounts for the hypothesized relation between 
entrepreneurship choices and internal organizational structures, several other conditions 
should further hold. Specifically, if power dependence accounts for the positive relation 
between the risk of entrepreneurial defections and the strength of organizational 
incentives - discretion and compensation - the hypothesized relation should be mitigated 
by an organization’s bargaining power. An assumption underlying this logic is that an 






rewards to retain potential entrepreneurs. Thus, one may reasonably posit that the weaker 
the employer’s bargaining position, the more likely the organization to cede financial and 
discretionary rewards to counter the risk of entrepreneurial departures. Conversely, an 
organization in a favorable bargaining position will be less compelled to cede internal 
rewards to nascent entrepreneurs. Consistent with this argument, organization theorists 
and economic sociologists have documented that employers in stronger positions of 
power are more prone to limit their employees’ rewards. Phillips (2001), for example, 
finds that employers in favorable bargaining positions disadvantage their employees’ 
career attainments. Sørensen and Kalleberg (1981) and Sørensen (1983) show that 
organizations turn away from internal promotions toward the external labor market to the 
extent that they hold greater power vis-à-vis their employees.  
Organizations are in a stronger bargaining position to the extent that they posses 
resources that can be shared with and are desired by employees. Although numerous 
determinants could be named, I focus on three factors likely to influence the availability 
of organizational resources and to affect the organization’s bargaining position: 
organization’s performance, age, and scope. Higher performing organizations are in a 
more favorable bargaining position because they generate larger revenues that can be 
shared with and are desired by employees. Hence, I expect better performing firms to be 
more reluctant to procure employees with internal rewards, such as compensation and 







Hypothesis 2a: The rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ school 
network alters will have a weaker impact on compensation for better performing 
organizations.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ school 
network alters will have a weaker impact on discretion for better performing 
organizations.  
 
Organization’s power over an employee is further contingent upon organization’s 
age. Organizational theorists have long suggested that new organizations often fail 
because of the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Compared to their counterparts, 
old organizations have an institutionalized external legitimacy, a developed network of 
resources, and an established framework of routines and processes, which mitigate the 
risk of mortality. Abundant resources accumulated over longer periods, low uncertainty, 
and strong legitimacy represent the source of organizational power vis-à-vis employees. 
Hence, I expect that older organizations will refrain from ceding internal rewards to 
employees at a higher risk of entrepreneurial departures. More formally, I hypothesize 
that:  
Hypothesis 3a: The rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ school 
network alters will have a weaker impact on compensation for older 
organizations.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: The rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ school 
network alters will have a weaker impact on discretion for older organizations.  
 
Finally, organizations may be in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis a 
potential entrepreneur, when having a broader scope. Organizational ecologists have 
documented that firm scope, defined as the breadth of organizational practice areas, 






that organizations with a broader scope are more reluctant to cede internal promotions to 
their employees. Numerous studies in corporate strategy have provided further evidence 
in support of the claim that diversified organizations experience higher performance and 
accumulate more resources (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 
1980; Williamson, 1975). Conversely, a few studies in economic sociology suggest a 
negative relation between diversification and performance (e.g., Davis et al., 1994; 
Zuckerman, 1999, 2000).  
 While evidence that organizations broader in scope have stronger life chances 
remains inconclusive, one possibility is that diversified organizations should be in a more 
favorable bargaining position regarding employees. Therefore, I expect organizational 
scope to mitigate the relation between the risk of entrepreneurial departures and the 
amount of discretion and compensation that organizations will be willing to cede to their 
employees. This leads to the following hypotheses:    
Hypothesis 4a: The rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ school 
network alters will have a weaker impact on compensation for organizations 
broader in scope.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The rates of external ventures founded by the employees’ school 
network alters will have a weaker impact on discretion for organizations broader 
in scope.  
 
Methods and Analyses 
Mutual Fund Data – Sampling Frame 
As in the two previous studies, I use a sample of all mutual funds in the CRSP US 






CRSP is survivor-bias free, as it includes information on both live and defunct funds. I 
focus on the data on funds’ characteristics, including fund name, fund family 
(management company) name, fund age, inception date, net asset value, quarterly return, 
total assets, expense ratio, and turnover ratio, including defunct funds. For the purpose of 
my study, the unit of analysis is defined as manager-month.  
Dependent Variables   
Managerial Compensation. Although data on exact managerial compensation in 
the mutual fund industry is simply nonexistent, the finance literature commonly uses a 
proxy that represents the product of assets under manager’s supervision and the expense 
ratio, where the expense ratio indicates the total investment that shareholders pay for the 
fund’s operating expenses, including management fees or the compensation received by 
the manager. I forward the measure of managerial compensation one year into the future. 
For robustness, I use a six-month period and obtain similar results (unreported). The 
measure is observed monthly.  
Managerial Discretion. I measure manager’s discretion by accounting for the 
amount of decision-making control she has over the funds supervised. Funds managed by 
multiple managers have diffused decision-making processes and provide any single 
manager with less control over important decisions, such as the selection of stocks to buy 
or to sell. For each manager, the variable is equal 1 divided by the number of co- 
managers supervising the focal fund. Therefore, the variable takes values from 0 to 1, 






therefore, endowed with greater discretion. I forward the measure of organizational 
discretion one year into the future. For robustness, I use a six-month period and obtain 
similar results (unreported). The measure is observed monthly. 
Explanatory Variables 
 Entrepreneurial Exit Risk.  To proxy the threat of entrepreneurial departures, I 
measure the rates of external ventures founded by the entrepreneur’s school network 
alters. As demonstrated in the second empirical study, the risk of entrepreneurial exit 
increases for actors tied to school network alters who had previously founded external 
ventures. An additional advantage of the network variable is its relative exogeneity with 
respect to the characteristics of the parent organization. Because external school networks 




            Organizational Performance. Firm performance is calculated as the average fund 
return for the focal fund family using a value-weighted approach. The value-weighted 
approach captures the total return by multiplying each family’s return by its relative size 
in the family, and by taking the sum across all weighted fund returns inside the firm.  
                                                        
21An alternative operationalization of the independent variable may be organizational turnover rates. While 
such an operationalization is plausible, I argue that it is inferior to the current operationalization for several 
reasons. First, unlike the network measure, past departures are less likely to proxy for the threat faced by 
the organization in the present. Past departures may not predict future departures; it may be that most 
talented employees have already left in the past period, decreasing the probability of the future turnover. 
Moreover, unlike my current measure, organizational turnover rates are relatively more endogenous to the 







Organizational Age. To measure firm age, I use the CRSP database to derive the 
age of the oldest fund in the family.  
 Organizational Scope. Firm scope is operationalized as the number of different 
types of funds that a management company offers. Using the CRSP data, I count the 
number of investment objectives across the funds in a company. For robustness, I include 
a percentage measure by dividing the number of different funds offered by the number of 
all possible investment objectives. The results (unreported) are robust to the alternative 
measure.  
Control Variables        
Organizational/Managerial Characteristics.  I control for a range of 
organizational characteristics that may influence organizational propensity to strengthen 
internal incentives. To that end, I include the covariates of organizational size, 
performance, age, scope, and the total employee number. I further include the measures 
of managerial characteristics, including manager’s gender, and the controls for human 
capital such as performance, and an elite-school degree.  
Empirical Model 
I use OLS regression models to estimate the effect of entrepreneurial departures’ 
threat on the change in organizational incentives. To address concerns related to 
unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation, firm-fixed effects are used for models 
including time-varying independent variables. I further mitigate the problem of serial 
















are firm-fixed effects, 
 t
are time-fixed effects, X is the vector of the 
explanatory variables, and Y(.) is the OLS function. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. Managerial 
compensation (t+12) equals to 7.0 while managerial discretion (t+12) in the firm amounts 
to 0.825 and has a maximum value of 1. The mean value of school network members 
who created external venture past year is 1.63 and varies between 0 and 14. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5.1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Organizational Response to Entrepreneurship Choices: Multivariate Analysis 
Table 5.2 presents the results estimated using firm-fixed effects regression models 
to test the hypothesized effect of entrepreneurial defections on organizational incentive 
structures. Model (1) shows the estimates for the effect of the risk of entrepreneurial exit 
on the average amount of discretion ceded by the organization in the following year. The 
results provide support for the hypothesized relation; a positive coefficient on the 






risk of entrepreneurs’ exit are prone to cede a greater amount of discretion to their 
employees in the following year. Model (2) shows the estimates for the effect of the risk 
of entrepreneurial departures on organizational compensation. Hypothesis 1b received 
empirical support: a positive coefficient on the network measure indicates that an 
increase in the rates of external ventures, founded by the entrepreneurs’ school network 
alters, increases the probability that an organization will provide potential entrepreneurs 
with greater compensatory rewards next year. Together, findings demonstrated in Table 
5.2 provide a strong support for the hypothesis that organizations react to boundary 
changes triggered by the individual-level choices.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5.2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Table 5.3 further reports the results regarding the theoretical mechanism 
underlying the relation between the threat of entrepreneurial departures and the change in 
organizational compensation and discretion. Model (1) provides support for Hypothesis 
2a indicating that better performing organizations will cede lesser compensatory rewards 
to potential entrepreneurs in response to the threat of entrepreneurial departures. 
Moreover, results presented in Models (2) provide support for Hypothesis 2b; a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the probability of ceding a greater 
amount of discretion decreases with organizational performance. 
------------------------------------------ 







Table 5.4 presents the estimates for the moderating role of organizational age on 
the relation between the risk of entrepreneurial departures and internal incentive systems. 
Model (1) indicates that organizational age amplifies the probability that the firm will 
provide greater compensation to its employees. Consistently, Model (2) demonstrates the 
moderating role of organizational age. Hypothesis 3b receives no support: instead, a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term implies that organizational age amplifies, 
rather than mitigates, the observed correlation. In contrast to the prediction, older 
organizations are more likely to procure nascent entrepreneurs with discretion, when the 
risk of external entrepreneurship increases. One reason why organizational age may 
amplify, rather than mitigate, the probability of organizational concessions vis-à-vis 
nascent entrepreneurs may be related to organizational power. Existing studies have 
provided broad support for the proposition that older organizations are more likely to 
constrain individual self-direction and limit the pursuit of novel ideas. For example, 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) associate older organizations with greater inertia that should 
discourage middle managers from new product development. Numerous studies further 
show that older work environments constrain individual autonomy and hinder the 
formation of entrepreneurial skills (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Sørensen, 2007a; Wagner, 
2004). One implication of this line of research is that older organizations may be less 
attractive to potential employees; this would, in turn, weaken organizational power over 







Insert Table 5.4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Finally, Table 5.5 shows the estimates for the moderating impact of 
organizational scope. As predicted in Hypothesis 4a, organizations broader in scope are 
less compelled to provide potential entrepreneurs with a greater amount of compensation. 
Model (2) shows that the probability that an organization cedes discretion to 
entrepreneurs at a higher risk of exit decreases with firm scope. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 4b, organizations with a broader scope are less compelled to increase 
employees’ discretion, when potential entrepreneurs are at a higher risk of exit.   
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5.5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Together, these findings provide evidence that power-dependence mechanisms 
account for organizational response to entrepreneurship choices. Consistent with the 
power-dependence theory, I find that organizations in stronger bargaining positions are 
less compelled to provide entrepreneurs with internal incentives to induce a new venture 
formation inside.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The objective of the present chapter is to examine whether and how parent 
organizations respond to the changes in their boundaries triggered by the choices of 






the link between organizational characteristics and the life chances (e.g., growth, 
survival) of a spin-off (e.g., Burton, Sørensen and Beckman 2002; Higgins and Gulati, 
2003), little attention has been devoted to understand how progeny organizations impact, 
in turn, their parents. Using the conceptual framework of power dependence (Emerson, 
1962), I argue that parent organizations do not remain passive, when challenged by the 
threat of entrepreneurial departures. Instead, when the mutual employer-entrepreneur 
dependence shifts in favor of the employee, organizations make concessions in an effort 
to retain entrepreneurial talent inside. In support of this claim, I find that an increase in 
the rates of external ventures, founded by the entrepreneurs’ informal network members, 
leads to an increase in the average amount of discretion and compensation procured by 
the organization. Power dependence perspective provides a plausible mechanism to 
account for the observed relation. The general pattern that emerges from the results 
indicates that power-dependence dynamics account for an organizational adjustment to 
entrepreneurship choices. I find that the probability of organizational concessions vis-à-
vis potential entrepreneurs decreases with a stronger bargaining position of the parent. 
Better performing organizations with a larger scope of activities are less likely to confer 
rewards on nascent entrepreneurs.       
 By documenting a power-dependence-driven impact of entrepreneurship choices 
on parent organization, this chapter makes a contribution to several research agendas. 
First, my findings enrich the current sociological perspectives on the parent-progeny 






Phillips, 2002). Whereas prior research has focused almost exclusively on the progeny, 
the present study suggests that more attention should be devoted to the parent 
organization. Contrary to the prior work that provides a passive view on the parent 
organization, the present study offers a more dynamic perspective. I provide evidence that 
choices of individual entrepreneurs inside the organization determine the future incentive 
structures in the organization. Moreover, the present chapter is one of the few to 
emphasize the role of power-dependent relations in the management of an organizational 
boundary. While previous work has focused on understanding inefficiencies arising from 
organizational boundaries (e.g., Williamson, 1985), I provide evidence for an alternative 
mechanism of power dependence (Emerson, 1962) to understand if and how 
organizations manage their boundaries. Future studies should further explore the role of 
power in shaping the boundaries around organizations. For example, additional insights 
may be gained from examining the conditions under which power-dependence relations 
dominate organizational strive for efficient outcomes. More broadly, by establishing a 
theoretical and empirical link between entrepreneurship choices and the change in 
organizational structures, this chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the micro-
level mechanisms behind an organizational-level change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
Kotter, 1996). Using the example of entrepreneurship choices, I demonstrate how social 
actors bring about, through their career trajectories and social ties, a change in 
organizational structures.         






defections affect the parent firm. Using the conceptual framework of power dependence, 
I hypothesized and found empirical support for the claim that organizations strengthen 
internal incentive structures to retain prospective entrepreneurs. Together, my findings 
enrich several literatures, including research on organization change, entrepreneurial 






Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics        
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Managerial Compensation (t+12) 7.012 24.1 0 893.12 
Managerial Discretion (t+12) 0.825 0.26 .071 1 
School network alters creating external funds  1.631 2.207 0 14 
Manager’s Discretion (1/fund co-managers’ count) 0.654 0.305 0.04 1 
Manager’s Gender (1 if male)  0.855 0.305 0 1 
Firm Size (Assets) 40,782.02 114,425.4 0.036 1,097,765 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) 25.7 27.8 1 145 
Firm Performance (weighted family returns) 0.008 0.047 -0.891 1.623 















School network alters creating external funds (mean) 0.005*** 0.252** 
 (0.001) (0.105) 
Manager’s Gender -0.028*** 14.529*** 
 (0.008) (1.056) 
Manager’s Performance  0.048 -10.263* 
 (0.046) (6.051) 
Elite Degree -0.030*** -6.509*** 
 (0.004) (0.593) 
Manager’s Discretion  -8.175*** 
  (0.907) 
Organizational Performance -0.059 9.109* 
 (0.041) (5.460) 
Organizational Size  0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Organizational Age -0.000 0.292*** 
 (0.000) (0.033) 
Total Employees -0.006*** 0.476*** 
 (0.000) (0.057) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 28461 28461 
R-squared 0.62 0.40 
Standard errors in parentheses   







Table 5.3. Power Dependence: Organizational Performance 
 
Variables                                                             






School network alters founding 
external funds (mean) 
  0.211** 0.005*** 
 (0.106) (0.001) 
Manager’s Gender 13.675*** -0.028*** 
 (1.058) (0.008) 
Manager’s Performance  -9.938 0.047 
 (6.074) (0.046) 
Manager’s Elite Degree  -6.476*** -0.030*** 
 (0.595) (0.004) 
Manager’s Discretion -7.817***  
 (0.910)  
Firm Performance 10.330* -0.049 
 (5.644) (0.043) 
Firm Age 0.289*** -0.000 
 (0.033) (0.000) 
Firm Size (Total Assets)  0.000 
  (0.000) 
Total Employees 0.745*** -0.006*** 
 (0.053) (0.000) 
Firm Performance * School network 
alters founding external funds 
-1.533* -0.010** 
 (1.263) (0.010) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 28461 28461 
R-squared 0.39 0.62 
Standard errors in parentheses   






Table 5.4. Power Dependence: Organizational Age 
 
Variables                                                             






School network alters founding 
external funds (mean) 
0.534*** 0.005*** 
 (0.143) (0.001) 
Manager’s Gender 13.724*** -0.027*** 
 (1.058) (0.008) 
Manager’s Performance  -9.599 0.051 
 (6.069) (0.046) 
Elite Degree  -6.533*** -0.031*** 
 (0.595) (0.004) 
Manager’s Discretion -8.052***  
 (0.913)  
Firm Performance 0.023*** -0.063 
 (0.007) (0.041) 
Firm Age 0.264*** -0.001*** 
 (0.034) (0.000) 
Firm Size (Total Managers) 0.743*** 0.000 
 (0.053) (0.000) 
Firm Age * School network alters 
founding external funds 
0.023*** 0.001*** 
 (0.007) (0.000) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 28461 28461 
R-squared 0.39 0.62 
Standard errors in parentheses   






Table 5.5. Power Dependence: Organizational Scope 
 
Variables 






School network alters founding external 
funds (mean) 
0.400** 0.007*** 
 (0.158) (0.001) 
Manager’s Gender 14.152*** -0.029*** 
 (1.068) (0.008) 
Manager’s Performance  -9.119 0.026 
 (6.206) (0.047) 
Manager’s Elite Degree  -6.147*** -0.033*** 
 (0.607) (0.005) 
Manager’s Discretion -8.710***  
 (0.933)  
Firm Performance 8.504 -0.041 
 (5.613) (0.042) 
Firm Age 0.214*** 0.000 
 (0.034) (0.000) 
Firm Size (Total Assets)  0.000* 
  (0.000) 
Firm Size (Total Managers) 0.291*** -0.005*** 
 (0.080) (0.001) 
Firm Scope 2.412*** -0.003 
 (0.302) (0.002) 
Firm Scope * School network alters 
founding external funds 
-0.120* -0.001** 
 (0.073) (0.001) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 






Table 5.5 (contd.). Power Dependence: Organizational Scope 
 
Variables 






R-squared 0.40 0.62 
Standard errors in parentheses   








Several decades ago, Schumpeter warned us that economic development would 
ultimately lead to the disappearance of the entrepreneur, and that large firms with a 
considerable degree of market power would drive technological progress (Schumpeter, 
1950). As a rejoinder, the present study provides an unprecedented window into 
entrepreneurial rates both inside and outside large organizations. Using the empirical 
setting of the mutual fund industry, I find that, contrary to the Schumpeterian prophecy, 
within the population of entrepreneurial individuals as many as 16% leave larger 
organizations to found new ventures externally, even in spite of strong formal incentives 
(i.e., discretion and compensation) often provided by the parent organization to induce 
the creation of a new venture inside. However, consistent with Schumpeter’s claim, I too 
find that innovative activity and the creation of new ventures frequently take place inside 
established organizations. Whereas, since Schumpeter, scholars have typically examined 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Aldrich, 1999; Aldrich and Widenmeyer, 1993; Sørensen and 
Audia, 2000) and internal venture formation (e.g., Amit, Glosten, and Mueller, 1993; 
Burgelman, 1983; Pinchot, 1985; Schumpeter, 1942; 1950) in separation, my dissertation 






entrepreneurial outcomes, given their interrelated nature. Specifically, I argue that 
examining the conditions under which mobile knowledge workers create new ventures 
internally and when, by contrast, they choose to transition to entrepreneurship, largely 
enriches the current understanding of entrepreneurship, processes of organizational 
emergence, and organizational boundaries.   
By examining the determinants of entrepreneurship choices, my dissertation 
offers a set of theoretical insights that contribute in important ways to several streams of 
research. First, I provide a set of theoretical mechanisms to account for a nascent 
entrepreneur’s choice between the formation of a new venture internally versus 
externally. Whereas previous research has established the role of career histories in 
facilitating entrepreneurial entry (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; Freeman 1986; Phillips, 
2002; Burton, Sørensen and Beckman 2002; Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Romanelli, 1991; 
Sørensen 2007a), I provide evidence that the present theoretical models should 
incorporate career imprints to predict the choice between internal and external 
entrepreneurship. Findings indicate that a greater exposure to risk early in the career 
increases the propensity of external rather than internal venture formation. As expected, 
the probability of external foundings further increases for actors whose coworkers 
founded new ventures outside during the formative career stages. Conversely, I do not 
find support for the hypothesized relation between an individual’s transition to 
intrapreneurship and the rates of coworker-founded internal ventures. The effect of 






social actors are less likely to rely on their formative experiences if those experiences 
triggered a negative environmental response. Together, findings presented in the first 
empirical study contribute to the line of work that relates entrepreneurial process to 
career histories (e.g. Brittian and Freeman, 1986; Boeker, 1988; Carroll and Mosakowski, 
1987; Higgins, 2005; Shane and Khurana, 2003). More broadly, by documenting the role 
of career imprints in shaping entrepreneurial choices, the first empirical study provides 
an insight into the role of individuals in shaping organizational boundaries.  
The second empirical chapter extends the theoretical framework presented in the 
first study. I argue that, in addition to career imprints, entrepreneurship choices are 
influenced by a social structure in which individuals are embedded. Although traditional 
views point to the role of formal structures in shaping agency in the organization, I argue 
that agency is also determined by the informal social structure in which actors are 
embedded. Findings presented in this study indicate that entrepreneurial decisions are 
influenced by formal structures to the extent that the parent organization induces internal 
venture formation by providing fund managers with higher compensation and greater 
discretion. However, the impact of incentives is limited by the fund manager’s informal 
social network of preexisting ties to her school colleagues. Specifically, I find that fund 
managers imitate previous entrepreneurship choices of other school network members. 
Additional analyses show that the effect of school ties is amplified by the spatial 
proximity of school network members, and is greater within same-gender school ties – 






structural approach, the second empirical study complements the first paper; it expands 
the initial theoretical framework to account for a wider range of the social determinants 
of entrepreneurial choices. Taken together, the two dissertation chapters offer an 
extensive account of the social mechanisms and the micro-level processes that shape the 
macro-level phenomena of organizational boundaries.  
 The third study shifts the focus from entrepreneurial actors to parent organizations. 
Specifically, the last empirical chapter examines the impact of entrepreneurial departures 
on parent organizations. Whereas existing theoretical frameworks have considered 
established organizations as passive in response to entrepreneurial spin-offs, the results 
show that organizations strengthen their internal incentive structures to retain potential 
entrepreneurs. Specifically, organizations cede to potential entrepreneurs greater 
compensation and discretion that enhance internal venture formation. The results 
presented in the paper further suggest that power-dependence mechanisms account for an 
organizational response to the risk of entrepreneurial defections; I find that organizational 
performance and scope mitigate the firm’s propensity to strengthen its internal incentive 
systems. Overall, the third empirical study provides a set of findings that enrich the 
current understanding of the parent-progeny relations (e.g., Brittian and Freeman, 1980; 
Phillips, 2002). The results provide powerful evidence that entrepreneurship choices 
affect parent organizations by reshaping their internal incentive structures.  
 More broadly, by examining the conditions under which new ventures are 






individual in shaping and specifying the boundaries of the modern organization. First, 
there have been few attempts to link organizational boundaries and entrepreneurship. 
While prior work has pointed to mergers and acquisitions, outsourcing (Lounsbury, 
2007), and joint ventures (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) as the mechanisms 
that redraw the boundaries of the firm, the role of entrepreneurship in this process has 
been largely overlooked. Yet whether new ventures are formed internally or externally 
plays an important role in specifying which activities are conducted inside and which 
take place outside the firm (Williamson, 1985). 
 Moreover, whereas the prevailing theories concentrate on the role of a unitary 
organizational actor in delimiting the boundaries of its activity (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 
1996; Williamson, 1985), there is little understanding of how boundaries of the firm are 
redrawn by career decisions of middle managers, whose goals and interests are not 
always aligned with those of the organization. Indeed, my findings suggest that the 
variation in the characteristics of the individuals’ social ties has an important impact on 
how the boundary of the organization is specified and which activities occur inside and 
which fall outside the organizational domain. Consequently, the current study opens a 
fruitful avenue for future research that would integrate the role of individuals into the 
current understanding and the existing theories of organizational boundaries.   
Scope Conditions and Future Research  
In considering the generalizability of this study’s findings, it is necessary to take 






provides a unique opportunity to observe and compare entrepreneurial processes both 
inside and outside established organizations, the theoretical mechanisms operating in this 
specific setting are unlikely to be founded in every other context. Specifically, several 
scope conditions need to be present for the theory to apply to other contexts. I expect my 
entrepreneurship theory to provide most explanatory power in knowledge-based contexts, 
where the core technology of the organization lies in human capital rather than physical 
assets. In industries driven by human assets, a potential entrepreneur can more easily 
create a new business unit internally, or leave to start up a new organization outside. In 
financial services and other professional service organizations of similar type, human 
assets drive the creation of both internal and external ventures; by contrast, I would 
expect the theoretical implications of the study to be less relevant in manufacturing, 
where entrepreneurial processes tend to depend on the availability of raw materials rather 
than the choices of an entrepreneurial individual. Future research should further examine 
whether the theoretical framework developed in this study can be successfully applied to 
understand the selection of organizational members into internal and external 
entrepreneurship in other knowledge-intensive settings.   
Moreover, a large number of entrepreneurial events in my data occur in the 
context of large companies that hold billions of financial assets. In this respect, the study 
adds and is comparable to a myriad of other entrepreneurship studies that examine the 
effect of organizational size on the emergence of new organizations (e.g., Dobrev and 






external ventures, the unique advantage of the present paper is that it allows to 
empirically measure the creation of internal business units by entrepreneurial members of 
the organization. In addition to exploring other empirical contexts, future work could 
further apply the theoretical framework developed in this study to organizations of 
different size, age, or structure. Substantial benefit could be derived from gaining a 
deeper insight of how organizational characteristics provide additional contingencies to 
understand the selection to internal and external entrepreneurship.  
Finally, the theory developed in the study should find an even stronger empirical 
support in a non-financial context. Although, by the nature of the profession, portfolio 
managers are most prone to be motivated by financial gains, I nevertheless find that their 
informal social ties exert a substantial influence on entrepreneurship choices, even when 
accounting for monetary incentives present inside the organization. Moreover, the impact 
of informal school networks is substantial in its magnitude, despite the finance-driven 
and money-focused research setting. Because the context of the mutual fund industry 
represents a conservative setting in which to document the impact of informal school 
networks on entrepreneurship choices, I expect the empirical support for my arguments to 
be even stronger in alternative non-financial settings. Future studies should therefore seek 
to understand whether entrepreneurial actors in financial services are idiosyncratic and 







The theoretical implications of the dissertation extend well beyond the details of 
entrepreneurial process. By examining the determinants of internal and external venture 
formation, the current paper hopes to draw the attention of organizational scholars to the 
ways in which individuals and the differences amongst them shape some of the most 
important firm-level outcomes, related to internal venturing, organizational founding, and 









Table A1.  The Effect of Career Imprints on Entrepreneurship Choices: Coworkers’ Influence (with manager-random effects) 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Internal ventures founded by 
coworkers early in the actor’s 
career (count) 
-0.327    
 (8.395)    
Internal ventures founded by 
coworkers (count) 
        -105.068***    
 (11.987)    
External ventures founded by 
coworkers early in the actor’s 
career (count) 
 14.770***   
  (3.069)   
External ventures founded by 
coworkers  
(count) 
 9.526***   
  (3.436)   
Imprinted Discretion (average)    0.803 
    (0.845) 
Firm Discretion (average)    2.573*** 
    (0.862) 
Imprinted Risk (average)   16.331*  
   (8.369)  
Firm Risk (average)   31.933***  
   (8.630)  
Manager's Gender 0.780 1.118* 1.128* 1.280* 
 (0.502) (0.669) (0.679) (0.688) 
Manager's Age -0.038** -0.052** -0.042** -0.050** 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Manager's Performance 15.813*** 20.103*** 20.012*** 20.706*** 
 (3.661) (4.278) (4.338) (4.375) 
Manager's Discretion -0.237 -0.467 -0.354 -1.622*** 
 (0.383) (0.470) (0.477) (0.594) 
Manager's Compensation -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Elite Degree  -0.048 0.039 0.081 0.166 
 (0.536) (0.754) (0.781) (0.782) 
Highest Degree Earned -0.292 -0.188 -0.391 -0.344 
 (0.270) (0.374) (0.381) (0.381) 
Manager's Industry Tenure 0.002 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 






Table A1.  (cont.) The Effect of Career Imprints on Entrepreneurship Choices: Coworkers’ Influence (with manager-
random effects) 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Performance -1.417 1.149 0.489 0.676 
 (3.564) (4.241) (4.402) (4.323) 
Firm Age -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) 0.001 0.012* 0.007 0.010 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Market volatility -19.301** -38.047*** -43.153*** -40.463*** 
 (8.948) (10.543) (10.890) (10.681) 
Manager-Random Effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20574 20594 20571 20594 
Standard errors in parentheses     






Table A2. The Logit Model of Internal vs. External Entrepreneurship Rates (Full Model)  















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Imprinted Risk 8.639* 9.681** 9.793** 12.384** 
 (4.587) (4.887) (4.715) (5.163) 
Imprinted Discretion -0.013 0.002 -0.032 -0.055 
 (0.483) (0.506) (0.492) (0.523) 
Int. ventures founded by coworkers 
early in the career  
3.816 4.169 2.205 1.384 
 (5.784) (5.995) (5.959) (6.175) 
Internal ventures founded by coworkers -91.867*** -92.204*** -91.005*** -92.766*** 
 (9.715) (10.338) (9.505) (9.947) 
Ext. ventures founded by coworkers 
early in the career  
5.266*** 4.783*** 5.153*** 4.734*** 
 (1.446) (1.476) (1.446) (1.471) 
External ventures founded by coworkers 
(count) 
25.702*** 22.915*** 26.361*** 22.517*** 
 (5.877) (6.011) (5.987) (6.079) 
School network alters creating external 
funds (count) 
 0.491***  0.681*** 
  (0.066)  (0.084) 
School network alters creating internal 
funds (count) 
  -0.146*** -0.079* 
   (0.036) (0.044) 
School network size (count)    -0.033*** 
    (0.009) 
Firm Risk 14.093** 9.965* 13.985** 8.829 
 (5.829) (6.024) (5.933) (6.156) 
Firm Discretion 1.222* 1.207* 1.286* 1.148* 
 (0.642) (0.671) (0.655) (0.691) 
Manager’s Discretion -0.582 -0.373 -0.634 -0.435 
 (0.381) (0.399) (0.388) (0.414) 
Manager’s Compensation -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Manager's Gender 0.460 0.267 0.453 0.263 
 (0.365) (0.383) (0.368) (0.395) 
Manager's Age -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.027** -0.031** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Manager’s Performance 13.862*** 15.066*** 13.545*** 14.826*** 






Table A2. (contd.). The Logit Model of Internal vs. External Entrepreneurship Rates (Full Model) 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Highest Degree Earned  -0.266 -0.386* -0.245 -0.353 
 (0.196) (0.207) (0.200) (0.216) 
Elite School Degree -0.188 -0.431 0.103 0.323 
 (0.398) (0.433) (0.412) (0.461) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Employees -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Firm Performance  0.949 1.160 0.623 0.988 
 (3.096) (3.213) (3.191) (3.334) 
Firm Age -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Market volatility -17.291** -16.698** -18.409** -20.600** 
 (7.604) (8.065) (7.746) (8.509) 
Firm-random effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20535 20535 20535 20535 
Pseudo R-squared 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 
Standard errors in parentheses     






Table A3. The Cox Model and the Multinomial Logit Model of Internal vs. External Entrepreneurship Rates 
Variables  Competing Risks Multinomial Logit  
 Internal Venture 
External 
Venture Internal               External   Venture     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
School network alters creating external 
funds  
-0.019 0.383*** -0.001 0.433*** 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.017) (0.025) 
School network alters creating internal 
funds  
0.043*** -0.003 0.034*** -0.015 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.003) (0.011) 
Network Size 0.013 0.024** 0.004 0.021** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Manager’s Discretion 0.613*** 0.425** 0.204** 0.070* 
 (0.129) (0.205) (0.082) (0.166) 
Manager’s Compensation 0.007*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) 
Manager’s Gender (male) 0.005 0.439* 0.032 0.763*** 
 (0.130) (0.252) (0.090) (0.243) 
Manager’s Age  0.007 -0.015* 0.008*** -0.004** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) 
Manager’s Performance 3.462*** 5.610***  4.784* 1.295*** 
 (1.080) (2.063) (0.756) (1.563) 
Fund Size  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Elite School Degree 0.477** 0.071 0.164 0.296 
 (0.186) (0.284) (0.105) (0.203) 
Highest Degree Earned  0.113 0.002 0.020 0.040 
 (0.079) (0.137) (0.054) (0.107) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Fund Managers (Firm) 0.008** -0.016** 0.009*** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
Firm Performance  4.715*** -3.840* 5.118*** -0.541* 
 (1.220) (2.116) (0.790) (1.683) 
Firm Age 0.003 -0.007* 0.005*** -0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
Market volatility -15.984*** -20.079*** -0.098* -11.12*** 
 (2.246) (3.969) (1.217) (2.868) 
Observations 169289 122049 233876 233876 
Log Likelihood -6640.6514 -2261.7203 -12866.646   -12866.646   
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 






Table A4. The Logit Model of Internal vs. External Entrepreneurship Rates (Co-workers’ and Regional 
Influences) 
Variables 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
  (1) (2) 
School network alters creating external funds 
(count) 
0.604*** 0.619*** 
 (0.062) (0.111) 
School network alters creating internal funds 
(count) 
-0.278*** -0.432*** 
 (0.038) (0.080) 
Spatially prox. managers creating ext. funds 
(count) 
 0.415*** 
  (0.112) 
Spatially prox. managers creating internal funds (count)                                         -0.012 
  (0.010) 
Co-workers creating external funds (count)  0.348*** 
  (0.088) 
Co-workers creating internal funds (count)  0.018 
  (0.013) 
Manager’s Discretion -0.615* -1.387** 
 (0.332) (0.640) 
Manager’s Compensation -0.007** -0.002* 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Gender (male) 0.307 1.063 
 (0.413) (0.903) 
Manager’s Age  -0.013* -0.027* 
 (0.012) (0.023) 
Manager’s Performance 6.948** 13.343** 
 (2.751) (5.583) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure -0.003* -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Elite School Degree 0.745* 0.507 
 (0.429) (0.899) 
Highest Degree Earned  0.061 0.233 
 (0.198) (0.391) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Employees -0.022 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.022) 
Firm Performance  -4.921* -1.216* 
 (2.781) (5.533) 
Firm Age 0.014 0.047* 
 (0.016) (0.028) 
Market volatility -20.355*** -22.304* 
 (7.289) (11.822) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes 






Table A4 (contd.). The Logit Model of Internal vs. External Entrepreneurship Rates (Co-workers’ and Regional 
Influences) 
Variables 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
External vs. Internal 
Entrepreneurship 
  (1) (2) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.32 0.53 
Standard errors in parentheses 


















 (1) (2) (3) 





 (0.036)  (0.041) 
Internal School Ties (count)    0.142***  0.076 
 (0.050)  (0.056) 
School network alters creating external funds (count)  0.698*** 0.643*** 
  (0.068) (0.069) 
External School Ties (count)  0.036*** 0.014* 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Manager’s Discretion -0.773** -0.718** -0.614* 
 (0.311) (0.327) (0.332) 
Manager’s Compensation -0.005* -0.006* -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Manager’s Gender (male) 0.672* 0.292 0.320 
 (0.394) (0.407) (0.411) 
Manager’s Age  -0.014* -0.012* -0.011* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Manager’s Performance 6.502*** 7.501*** 6.988** 
 (2.515) (2.749) (2.793) 
Fund Size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager’s Industry Tenure -0.002 -0.004** -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Elite School Degree 1.036*** 0.902** 0.928** 
 (0.369) (0.422) (0.444) 
Highest Degree Earned  0.151 0.030 0.049 
 (0.184) (0.191) (0.199) 
Firm Size (Total Assets) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Employees -0.024* -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Firm Performance  -5.039* -4.290* -4.697* 
 (2.621) (2.752) (2.804) 
Firm Age 0.017 0.014 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Market volatility -22.052*** -20.139*** -20.726*** 
 (6.844) (7.084) (7.317) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
School-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2171 2171 2171 
Pseudo R-squared 0.22 0.29 0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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